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The Left and the 
Economic Crisis
To a large extent, the current economic malaise, at the centre of which is the continuing drama 
of the national debt and the 
international finaancial markets, was 
a predictable outcome of a massive 
strategic contradiction within the 
policies of the Hawke government 
over its first three years of office. It is 
difficult to believe that the government 
could not have been aware from the 
beginning that its stated industrial and 
wage strategy, based upon the Accord 
and a program of sustained economic 
growth, was sharply at odds with its 
deregulatory financial policies, of 
which the deregulation of the dollar 
was the most visible - if hardly the 
most significant - expression. And, in 
fact, the strategy based upon the 
A ccord and econom ic grow th  
predated Keating's accession to the 
Treasury, and was to some extent 
beyond his control.
The policy of financial deregulation, 
by contrast, was Keating's enthusiasm 
from the outset. Historically, its 
ascendancy within the ALP Right in
NSW could perhaps be traced to the 
party's debate over uranium minig 
before the 1982 conference, when 
right-wing numbers person Graham 
Richardson took the extraordinary 
step of inviting a US State Department 
official to argue a deregulatory line 
for the s ale of uranium. The official 
stressed magnificently the enormous 
power of international capital over 
n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m ie s ,  a n d  th e  
importance of not angering the 
financial markets by failure to honour 
contracts: on the N.S.W. right the 
lesson apparently had great effect. At 
any event, it was about this time that 
the parliamentary party's prospective 
strategy came to subordinate fiscal 
expansionism to the demands of the 
international financial markets.
In government this soon developed 
a circular logic. Financial deregulation 
in an expansionary environment 
served merely to exacerbate the 
private foreign debt, while the removal 
of exchange controls could only serve 
to encourage capital outflow - leading 
to a situation where record profits co­
existed with levels of investment lower 
than the Whitlam years. This problem
- which was far more significant for 
the economy than the fall in the terms 
of trade - was not only one of the 
government's own making, it was in 
fact a predictable outcome of the short 
circuiting of the expansionary strategy 
by the deregulatory strategy.
The budget and the cloud hanging 
over the Accord have signalled that the 
two strategies are now at an impasse. 
The government’s political strategy 
now - inasmuch as it possesses one at 
all - appears to be directed towards 
sp l i tt ing  the labour m ovem ent,  
detaching the centre and the right, and 
taking them over to the 'new' 
contractionary policies as the 'only 
solution' to the malaise. This appears 
also to be the aim of ACTU President 
Simon Crean, whose expressions of 
'so l ida r i ty ' at the recent ALP 
Conference can only be taken as a sign 
that he does not as yet possess the 
strength to make a move to take the 
centre and right over to the Hawke- 
Keating strategy.
The next few months will be vital for 
the prospects of left and prgressive 
forces in general, and in pareticular for 
the prospects of the left within the 
trade union movement, it is highly
important that the trade union 
movement is not split, and that it 
remains united around the only 
response which can retain the support < 
of the movement as a whole, the so- I 
called 'nationalist'economic response. I 
Broadly speaking, the nationalist j 
response takes as given a number of 
factors - the balance of payment 
situation, low economic growth, and * 
an appalling level of domestic 
investment. Inevitably it also takes as 
given the underly ing structural I 
fragility of the Australian economy, | 
with the export sector heavy (and ] 
under Hawke and Keating actually 
increasing) reliance on primary f 
produce and raw minerals. Moreover, 
the nationalist approach can be 
divided into clearly distinct short-term f  
and long-term components. The shon ’ 
term component is based upon me 
industry  developm ent proposals 
formulated by the ACTU and
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endorsed by the  re cen t  A L P  
Conference - proposals aimed at 
drawing an increased contribution 
from the industrial base, and from 
goods with a high value-added 
component, into both domestic and 
foriegn demand. Within this short­
term strategy it is clear that the 
elements centred around the import- 
substitution policies are quite well- 
developed, while those centred around 
the restructuring of export goods 
industries are a good deal more 
conjectual.
T h is  s h o r t - t e r m  c o m p o n e n t  
necessitated a good deal of hard 
thinking on the part of the labour 
movement left. In particular, its 
adoption entailed a willingness to put 
up with more of the orthodox 
Treasury approach in the short-term, 
witn the aim of securing *n the 
meantime longer-term leverage over 
the structural changes at present 
facing the economy. It also entailed 
the recognition that, one way or 
another, Austalian industry faces a 
bout of 'restructuring'. The choice lies 
not in whether or not this should 
happen, but in whether it is to be 
shaped purely by the pulls of the 
international financial markets, or 
whether the process will be directed by 
conscious government policy - and 
wnether the labour movement itself 
will be in a position to play a decisive 
role.
In consequence, the strategy based 
around the nationalist response entails 
some quite enormous risks (as indeed 
did the original Accord strategy). The 
difference this time lies in the 
heightened awareness within the 
labour movement of the importance of 
an import policy in any expansionist 
response — and in a greater 
consciousness of the stakes involved. 
If the strategy fails, the third round 
will be one of straight out conflict - a 
situation which would be costly both 
for the government and the trade 
union movement and progressive 
forces in general.
On one side of the current, orthodox 
'internationalist' response, there is 
little difference in general direction 
between the leading sections of capital 
and the Hawke-Keating elements in 
the ALP. In the internationalist 
scenario, industry restructing is based 
upon the assumption that new export
structures will be able to trade their 
way out of A ustra lia 's  ex p o r t  
problems. There is little difference, too 
in the level of blind faith in the 
willingness of international capital to 
invest in these new structures once the 
fundamentals have been put in place. 
Nor is there any appreciable difference 
over the strategy's basis — an I.M.F. 
-style ‘crisis’ response of slowing down 
the economy by cutting effective 
demand.
The difference lies rather in the 
extreme constraints upon Hawke and 
Keating's ability to manouevre outside 
a basic range of responses. They are 
incapable of delivering the kinds of 
expenditure cuts which a conservative 
government would be able and willing 
to  d e l iv e r ;  they  are  n o t  a t 
present ablp to deliver wide-scale cuts 
in public expenditure and demand; 
and they are clearly not able to deliver 
a program of privatisation to help 
fund the internationalist response.
T h is  is a d i le m m a  w h ich  
ultimately Hawke and Keating could 
only resolve by decisively alienating 
every other sector of the ALP and the 
labour movement. Short of that, what 
they might hope to deliver is enough in 
the way of restored economic growth 
not ot have to cut public expenditure 
further. Allied with this, they probably 
forsee a situation of almost automatic 
wage discounting for the forseeable 
future. In any event, a large part of 
capital is possibly not fetishistic 
about the public sector - so long as 
welfare is funded through taxation (as 
in the case of the Medicare levy).
Without these constraints - with a 
change of government in other words- 
the other elements of the strategy 
could be expected to follow: 
deregulation of the labour market, 
initially around the edges; the 
destruction of wages policy and 
arbitration; attacks on the wages and 
conditions of marginalised sectors of 
the workforce; and the concomitant 
creation of a 'core' workforce 
resembling the old-style labour 
aristocracy.
Keating perhaps believes that if he 
can split the labour movement, and 
take the right and centre over to the 
internationalist strategy, then the 
government may be able to retain its 
'n a tu ra l  re la t io n sh ip ' with the 
movement, and thus also the ALP's
pretensions to being the 'natural party 
of government'. If he fails, the 
government will have no other course 
to follow except increasing isolation 
from all of its natural supporters. In 
that case, all that would be achieved 
would be the laying of the ground 
work for the far more reactionary 
solutions of a Howard government 
dominated by the New Right. The only 
serious alternative in the immediate 
future is unity within the labour 
movement around the nationalist 
response, coupled with a much 
broader campaign on the part of all the 
left and progressive forces, welfare and 
community groups, leading off from 
the current 'Change the Direction' 
campaign. DB
(The above is based upon a talk given 
recently by Arm Catling, an economist 
with the Reserve Bank in Sydney — 
Ed.)
Testing Time 
for the Tories
The political fortunes of the Thatcher government In not-so- Great Britain are at a low ebb. The fundamental problems of the 
economy are unresolved, indeed 
worsened, by a monetarist-oriented 
policy approach which has produced 
relentless e-industrialisation and 
forced over 3 J  million people into the 
dole queues. Industrial disputation Is 
rife, partly because of the concerted 
assault on trade unionism (though the 
legislation to require unions to hold 
votes on the maintenance of a political 
fund to support the Labour Party has 
backfired, all the unions to date having 
voted to do so).
There is an evident disillusionment 
in substantial sections of the electorate 
which has previously given the 
Conservatives such strong support. 
The most tangible expression of this 
was in May when two by-elections for 
parliament, and nation-wide local 
governm ent elections, p roduced  
almost uniformly bleak results for the 
lor the conservative Party. Both
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p a r l i a m e n ta ry  sea ts  had  been 
considered Conservative strongholds. 
The Tory candidate just scraped home 
in one, and the other was lost to the 
Social Democratic Party-Liberal 
Party Alliance. The swing against the 
government averaged 17 percent. In 
the local government elections, the 
Tories lost more tnan 700 seats and 
control of 29 councils, mainly to the 
Labour Party.
Of course, by-elections typically 
feature an anti-government swing. g 
And this also spills over into local | 
government elections where people  ̂
typically "think nationally, vote i  
locally", paying only secondary |  
attention to the local issues with which 5 
the elections are formally concerned. 
However, the extent of the swing was 
striking. Labour Party leaders were 
cock-a-hoop, claiming to be "on 
course to form the next national 
government". The alliance leaders 
were "over the moon" with the 
prospect of holding the balance of 
power in the next parliament. The 
Conservatives acknowledged it as a 
dire warning; and the staunchly 
proConservative Daily Telegraph ran 
an article, under the Heading "Vote of 
No Confidence", suggesting that Mrs. 
Thatcher should resign now in order to 
give a less abrasive leadership time to 
prepare for the next general election. 
There is no indication that she will. 
Her immediate response was to give a 
firm assurance that there would be no 
change in the government's policies.
Exp'anations for the loss of 
Conservative support are many and 
varied. Some commentators have 
stressed long-term problems which 
have generated cumulative concern: 
most obviously, the chronic problem 
o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  th e  
deterioration in the availability and 
quality of social services, particularly 
health and education. A somewhat 
bizarre variant on this theme is the 
view that it is the very "success" of the 
Thatcherite economic policies which 
has intensified the demands for a 
g rea ter  trick le-dow n of wealth  
th rough  exp en d itu re  on social 
services.
At the other extreme, other 
commentators have stressed personal 
problems within the Conservative 
Party — the conflict between Mrs. 
Thatcher and her Minister of Defence
over "the Westland affair", his 
subsequent resignation and that of 
another minister who had misled 
parliament, the aggressive personal 
style of party chairman Norman 
Tebbitt (famous for his advice to the 
unemployed: "get on your bike"), and 
so forth.
Then there is the Libya factor. 
Opinion polls suggest that about two 
out of three Britons did not support 
Mrs. Thatcher's decision to provide 
air-force bases for US planes to launch 
their attack against Libya. Quite 
simply, it is seen as having raised the 
risks of further terrorism directed 
against the citizenry. Moreover, it is 
widely seen as the act of a handmaiden 
to US interests. Unlike the Falklands 
war, it has provided no hasis for 
jingoistic national pride. There is no 
glory in being the junior partner in the 
Atlantic alliance. Finally, and most 
recently, there was the Common­
wealth Games where Mrs. Thatcher's 
intransigence on sanctions was seen as 
undermining the very basis of the 
Commonwealth itself.
Of course, there is plenty of time for 
reversals of party political fortunes 
before the next election. The British 
system requires a general election only 
every five years, so there is much more 
scope  th a n  in A u s t r a l ia  fo r  
governments to pursue unpopular 
policies or otherwise suffer reduced 
popularity, but recover in time for 
reelection. But, on the basis of the 
local elections (and a previous by­
election which saw an impressive 
victory for Labour in the London 
constituency of Fulham), the ude is
ru n n in g  s t ro n g ly  ag a in s t  the 
Conservatives.
If a similar swing were reported at 
the next general election, the state oi 
the parties would be Labour 300 
Alliance 164, Conservative 159 and 
others 27 (compared with the 1983 
election results of Conservative 397 
Labour 209, Alliance 23 and others 
21). But this is simply an arithmetical 
calculation, and more shrewd political 
assessments suggest a much closer 
balance between the support for the 
Labour and Conservative parties. 
Nudging the Tories into third place is 
beyond the wildest dreams of the 
alliance (trouncing the Labour Party 
would be a more typical, but even less 
realistic, dream). Still, the Alliance has 
established itself as a strong third 
force, more significant than the 
Australian Democrats have ever been 
on the local scene.
An inference which may be drawn i 
from the recent elections is that there is 
a situation of two two-party systems in 
the U.K. In one system the Tories i 
compete with Labour, and in the other 
with the Alliance. Mrs. Thatcher's 
government has aroused such strong 
feelings that electors are either clearly 
for it oragainstit;and, of those against 
it, many vote according to which 
party. Labour or the Alliance, is seen I 
likely to be the principal challenger. 
This tendency holds a clear danger for 
the Labour Party since, at the last 
general election, it was second to the 
Conservatives in fewer than one-third 
of the Conservative-held seats. But the 
Alliance, lacking a coherent solution 
to Britain's economic problems, has
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■he appcarance of a rallying-point for 
(protest votes. As the Daily Telegraph 
(lamented, "it is all too comfortable for 
■today's floating voter to float in and 
lout of the Alliance without the 
noulsearching once needed to float 
oetween Conservatives and Labour'.
Meanwhile, the Labour Party has 
ither problems on its hands. Despite 
considerable success in rebuilding the 
♦trength of the party, Mr. Kinnock's 
ommitment to the expulsion of the 
Militant tendency is bound to further 
fuel internal divisiveness. Kinnock's 
I position makes him seem more 
j middle-of-the-road in electoral terms, 
'jut at what price? The editor of The 
hfilitani argued in a letter to The 
Guardian that "the expulsion of 
Marxists is a prelude to turning the 
Labour Party into a second version of 
the Liberal/Social Democrats". After 
all, this is a country in which the 
Labour Party, for all its record of 
capitalist economic management 
I 'ged with reformism, is still widely 
known as the Socialists.
Finally, it is important to emphasise 
the regional character of the political 
situation. The United Kingdom is very 
far from united. In the south and 
south-east there is considerable 
jrosperity, and support for the Tories 
remains generally strong. But in the 
rest oi the country, from the Midlands 
to Wales, the north and Scotland, 
unemployment is acute and the level of 
support for the Thatcher government 
s minimal. The recent elections 
confirmed this duality, though there 
were significant losses even in the Tory 
heartlands. In the local government 
elections, the Labour Party successes 
have given it local control of all the 
major industrial cities. Even in the 
south, inner-u rban  areas have 
;enerally backed Labour: the first 
direct elections for the Inner London 
Education Authority ^ave Labour 39 
ot the 58 seats at stake.
The relationship between class and 
region is not one-to-one, but recent 
events have been a reminder, if one 
was needed, of the polarising effects of 
the Thatcher program. There are no 
grand claims about the achievement of 
consensus in the UK.
Frank Stttwell
Multlculturalism 
In Jeopardy
I t was in 1973 that the Whitlam Labor government introduced the policy of multicuituralism. 
This new-found policy proposed that 
all Australians should be able to 
maintain their own distinct cultural 
identity without fear of discrimin­
ation , and advocated that all 
Australians should have equal access 
to and be able to participate fully in 
s o c ia l  and i n s t i t u t io n a l  l i fe.  
Multicuituralism, therefore, was a 
significant departure from the past 
p o l i c ie s  o f  a s s i m i l a t i o n  and  
integration which had been based on 
the assumption that all members of 
Australian society should adopt "a 
commonly accepted way of life”. At 
the same time, it has also been the 
subject of considerable debate within 
the left — a debate focussing on the 
limitations (and possibilities) of 
multicuituralism in addressing social 
justice issues.
Since the introduction of this 
p o l ic y ,  s u c c e s s iv e  A u s t r a l i a n  
governments of different political 
persuasions have given support to 
multicuituralism. The recent budget 
decisions taken by the federal 
government have, in one moment, 
removed a number of key programs 
a n d  s e r v i c e s  w h ic h  s u p p o r t  
multicuituralism. Despite official 
statements to the contrary, it appears 
that there has been a significant 
c h a n g e  in the  g o v e r n m e n t ’s 
commitment to the social policy of 
multicuituralism.
P e rh a p s  the  m ost widely 
publicised decision concerns the 
merging of the Special Broadcasting 
S e rv ic e  w ith  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  
Broadcasting Corporation. Contrary 
to the recommendations made in a 
recent governm ent repo rt ,  the 
government has made a decision to 
proceed with the merging of the two 
bodies. While it is still not clear what
this merger means in concrete terms, it 
appears that the separate networks 
will be maintained. However, it is 
difficult to imagine how SBS will be 
able to continue in its present manner 
when it is placed under the control of a 
much larger organisation which is, 
i tse lf ,  e n c o u n te r in g  su b s ta n t ia l  
funding cuts and which has shown 
little commitment to the principles of 
servicing a culturally and linguistically 
diverse population.
Along with this decision, the 
government has decided to abolish the 
Australian Institute of Multicultural 
Affairs and replace it with an Office of 
Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs 
w i t h i n  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. 
S h o r t ly  a f te r  its e lec t io n  to  
government in 1983, the Labor 
government reviewed the institute. 
The review found that the institute had 
been largely ineffective and described 
it as "a costly failure”. However, the 
review also argued that there “was a 
near-unanimous conviction on the 
part of all sections of the community 
that AIMA represents worthwhile 
ideals deserving of retention if they can 
be revitalised and redirected in proper 
c h a n n e l s ” . In J u n e  1985 th e  
government established a new council 
for the institute and amended the 
AIMA Act to enable it to move 
beyond a narrow concern with cultural 
pluralism into a broader concern with 
social justice issues. Despite these 
recent decisions to retain the institute 
under a new charter, the government 
has now decided to pursue a “new 
strategy” for multicuituralism — 
without any consultation with ethnic 
communities, organisations which had 
worked with the institute over the past 
12 months, or the institue’s council. It 
is not clear what this strategy will 
ac tua lly  encom pass besides the 
establishment of an office.
As a result of the budget cuts, the 
area of education in and for a 
multicultural society has been severely 
affected. The Multicultural Education 
Program which began in the late 1970s 
has been disbanded, while the English 
as a Second Language Program (ESL) 
has been reduced by forty-five percent.
The Multicultural Education 
Program attempted to provide all 
students with the opportunity to 
develop an udnerstandingof their own
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and others’ cultural heritage; acquire 
or maintain a language other than 
E n g l i s h ;  e n c o u r a g e  p aren ts ,  
particularly those from non-English 
speaking backgrounds to participate 
in the education of their children; and 
also encourage schools to develop 
m ater ia ls  and p rog ram s which 
accurately portray the history of 
Australia's indigenous and immigrant 
people. In its weaker moments, this 
program supported initiatives which 
often reinforced stereotyping through 
what are commonly referred to as 
“spaghetti and dance" activities. In its 
stronger moments, it contested many 
o f  the  c u l t u r a l  assum ptions  
u n d e r p in n i n g  the  m ainstream  
curriculum which ensured that certain 
groups of students were excluded from 
full access to and participation in the 
schooling process. The disbanding ol 
this program will certainly pose a 
problem for the continuing of this 
task.
The reduction in the ESL 
program is in line with certain 
recommendations contained in a 
number of reports produced for the 
Schools' Commission in recent years. 
The argument put forward in these 
reports was that as ESL was an 
essential ongoing activity of schools. i( 
should no longer be funded as a 
Specific Purpose Program but should 
be funded through recurrent grants to 
the states. While there have been 
reductions in the ESL program, the 
states have theoretically been provided 
with enough funds to continue the 
same level of ESL. However, withou! 
mechanisms to ensure that funds 
which are intended for ESL, but are 
not specifically earmarked for thb 
area, are used for ESL, there is 
certainly a real risk that states will 
make significant cuts in this vital are? 
Whatever the intention of the federal 
government in this matter, in the Iasi 
resort it will be up to the stales as to 
how they will use their recurrenl 
funding. If the new strategy for 
multicultural affairs is to encompass 
issues of access and equity, as indeed i! 
must, then cuts to ESL would indicate 
that such a new strategy will no! 
progress beyond the level of rhetoric.
O
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ALTERNATIVES 
TO ANZUS
Jo Vallentine
A nuclear-free ,  independent  Australia based on a new sustainable economic, social 
and political order. That's my vision 
and my hope. It's also the hope of half 
> million Australians who put nuclear 
disarmament at the lop of their 
collective political agenda at the 1984 
federal election. They are too small 
words, “vision” and “hope” and, 
unfortunately, much underused in 
Australia today. Spoken in our federal 
parliamentary forum, they are almost 
tantamount to  confe ss ion s  o f  
weakness, both in mind and argument.
It was exactly this political 
nearsightedness that first plunged me 
into the sometimes murky waters of 
A ustra lian  p o l i t ic s .  A f te r  the 
Australian Labor Party's 1984 decis­
ion on uranium mining, which gave 
the green light to the Roxby Downs 
joint venturers, there was a vacuum in 
the electoral field which was partially 
filled by the fledgling Nuclear Disarm­
ament Party. As someone who
was, first and foremost, an activist, my 
decision to enter the mainstream 
parliamentary process was not taken 
lightly. The debate within the peace 
movement has been lively since the last 
federal election, with some people 
preferring that we stay out of this 
arena altogether and concentrate, 
instead, in working through the major 
parties and encouraging greater 
mobilisation of support at the 
community level. There are also those 
who believe that parliamentarians 
elected on a single issue platform 
cannot address the many interconnect­
ing concerns which face our society. 
Their suggestions focus around the 
development of a Green party which 
would field candidates with broad 
peace, social just ice and emvironment- 
al policies.
W ith  12 m o n t h s '  a c tu a l  
parliamentary experience, I am more 
drawn to the notion that I, as an 
independent, can do my best work 
concentrating on the issue of nuclear 
disarmament and its implications in 
the defence and foreign affairs area.
However, 1 believe it is important for 
us to draw the connections between 
nuclear disarmament and the broader 
peace  issues . W o rk in g  as an 
independent in the federal parliament 
on this single issue is, as I see it, the 
most effective way for me to work for 
change. If, on my election, people 
thought that a politician working full 
time on this issue could effect 
immediate change, reduce the number 
of nuclear weapons, manage to 
persuade the Labor government that it 
should ban the visits of nuclear 
warships to our ports, orterminate the 
leases on the three major US bases in 
Australia, then they would have been 
bitterly disappointed. Rather, I 
consider my task in politics to be one 
of changing attitudes, both of the 
major political parties and the 
Australian public. And I think it is in 
these vital areas that we are making 
some headway.
The main focus of my work, as I 
head into my second year in the 
Senate, will be striving to win 
Australians to the opinion that the 
only future lies in an independent 
nuclear-free Australia — and that 
means offering alternatives to the 
security blanket of ANZUS. A lot of 
work needs to be done to convince the 
seventy percent of Australians who 
cling to ANZUS that we can survive 
without an alliance which has moved
A lot of work needs to be done 
to convince the 70 percent of 
A ustralians who cling to 
ANZUS that we can survive 
without the alliance
us far and beyond the terms of the 
35year-old treaty. The challenge of 
d ev e lo p in g  c rea t iv e  a l t e r n a t iv e  
strategies for our future defence and 
security needs is one that faces all 
Australians. Our psychological, if not 
physical, reliance on our great friend 
and ally would have been greatly 
reduced if we were more actively 
concerned with these issues rather 
than leaving them to the academic and 
military boffins and the politicians.
This is an area which the peace 
m o v em en t  m ust a lso  a d d re s s  
seriously. It is a difficult task, given 
that the people involved in the 
movement have natural and strong
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reluctance to consider alternative 
defence in the context of continuing 
world-wide militarisation. But if we 
are indeed concerned with achieving 
the ultimate goal of a nuclear-free 
Australia, we must address the very 
real security concerns of the majority 
of Australians. Australia's progress 
along a nuclear-free path must, 
therefore, be a steady, step-by-step 
process.
The Dibb Report is a positive first 
step towards this goal as it outlines a 
more self-reliant defence posture for 
Australia. But do not think that the 
report somehow loosens the United 
States' nuclear stranglehold on us. We 
are still firmly entrenched in the US’ 
nuclear war strategies and, until we 
free ourselves from this morally 
debilitating alliance with one of the 
world’s great nuclear superpowers, we 
will never be truly independent. In 
fact. Defence Minister Beazley. when 
tabling the Dibb Report in the House 
of Representatives in June this year,
spent the first five minutes allaying 
Opposition fears that the Dibb R eport 
would offend the Americans. Rather 
than offending, the Dibb Report 
complies with US policy to the letter. 
In line with the Guam Doctrine 
enunciated by President Nixon in 
1969, Australia is finally looking
Governments have chosen a 
course which maintained our 
colonial client state mentality 
and immaturity
towards self-reliant defence — a 
position which successive Australian 
governments have chosen to ignore. 
Instead, those governments chose a 
course which maintained our colonial 
client state mentality and immaturity, 
refusing to tackle our own defence 
responsibilities.
We must contantly remind 
ourselves of our position within the
ANZUS treaty. It does not commti us 
to hosting US bases on Australian 
soil; it does not commit us to granting 
landing rights for B-52 bombers; I 
not commit us to allowing our ports to 
be used by nuclear-powered and I 
nuclear-armed warships. All of these | 
“obligations” have come about bv 
separate and mostly secret agreements 
between the US government and, on 
many occasions, individuals in various 
A u s t r a l i a n  g o v e r n m e n t s .  The j  
development of the alliance has moved 
heavily in the US’s favour ... we don’t 
even get a guarantee of help in time of 
threat to our national security. As we I 
a p p r o a c h  t h e  e m b a r r a s s i n g  
bicentenary of European occupation 
of Australia, it seems to be a penect 
time to look at our sovereignty and to 
examine the alliance to determine 
whether it is beneficial or even relevant 
to our defence.
The Australian government has I 
argued that we can have more impact 
on Washington from within ANZUS
• ANZUS is a  
h i  p r o te c tio n  
p ra c k e t
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than from outside it, but I can’t see any 
evidence of this in terms of progress at 
the Geneva arms talks, nor, for 
instance, during the current wheat 
crisis. Personally. I tnink it is naive of 
Australians to think that the US 
government should consider our 
wheat farmers ahead of its own. But 
the interesting twist in this debate has 
been the suggestion that the bases 
could be used as bargaining chips in an 
attempt to get a better deal for our 
farmers. We are always being told of 
the vital role the bases play in arms 
control. Obviously, the work is not 
vital enough when the farmers and the 
government stand to lose $400 million 
in lost wheat contracts. The mere 
suggestion undercuts the govern-
It is the spirit of self-reliance 
that I applaud in Paul Dibb’s 
report
ment’s main justification for keeping 
bases here. It is also a good 
i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  b a s e s ’ 
peacekeeping roles of monitoring and 
verification must indeed be miniscule 
for the government to even suggest 
that they may be expendable.
The current wheat crisis has put 
our alliance with the US into sharp 
fo c u s  fo r  m an y  A u s t r a l i a n s .  
Generations succeeding the World 
War have inherited the debt of 
gratitude of those who fought
alongside the US between 1941 and 
1945. I think we have repaid that debt 
many times over, and it is now time we 
took an independent and equal role in 
regional and international affairs. The 
events of recent months have clearly 
shown that our humble reliance and 
assumption of preferential treatment 
from our great ally are totally 
unfounded. The US could not have 
spelt out its position more clearly: it 
will look after its own interest first and 
foremost. It is a great shame that the 
string of Australian governments since 
1951 did not think likewise.
It is the spirit of self-reliance that I 
applaud in Paul Dibb’s report. That 
such a report was commissioned by a 
Labor government which has not 
shown itself to be dynamically 
different from previous conservative 
Liberal governments is encouraging in 
that it suggests it is pursuing a more 
self-reliant defence posture and 
seeking a more public debate on 
defence matters. However, while Mr. 
Beazley made it clear that we cannot 
depend on the AJNZUS alliance with 
any degree of certainty, he continues 
to argue that we still need the US 
because it provides us with intelligence 
information and superior military 
technology. It may well be true that the 
US provides us with a great deal ol our 
intelligence information, but just how 
much is relevant to the defence of 
Australia? I strongly submit that very 
little is relevant unless we intend to do 
s o m e t h i n g  o u t r a g e o u s  w i t h  
information such as troop deployment 
on the Sino-Soviet border. Australia’s 
own intelligence gathering service has 
proven, as recently as the fall of the 
Marcos regime earlier this year, that it 
c a n  m e e t  o u r  i n t e l l i g e n c e  
requirements, and those of our great 
ally, more efficiently than the 
indiscriminate vacuum cleaners of 
Pine Gap and Nurrungar.
As f o r  s u p e r i o r  m i l i t a r y  
technology, the first thing to point out 
is that, depending on our defence 
strategies, the military shopping list 
could vary considerably. We need only 
buy th a t  equ ipm ent which is 
appropriate for the defence of this 
country. Secondly, the superior 
military technology is paid for at 
considerable price. We are the United 
States’ second biggest buyer of 
military hardware. We don’t get
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bargain basement prices for the great 
costs of having US bases stationed on 
our soil, US nuclear warsnips or B-32 
bombers visit. There is no such thing 
as a free lunch ... or alliance.
1 agree essentially with Mr. 
Dibb’s initial analysis of our relative 
security in the world, which seems to 
reflect the findings of the 1981 Katter 
report. However, Mr. D ibb’s brief did 
not include the wider political and 
economic concerns that make for 
national security rather than purely 
military options. Nor was there any 
reference to alternative models of 
conflict resolution which we could 
explore from our secure strategic 
position; nor does he give us any 
reason why other countries in tne 
region should not see the Australian 
military buila-up in terms of security 
threat and follow suit, thus sparking a 
regional arms race among countries 
who cannot afford it any more than we 
can.
New Zealand is a shining example 
ofa regional neighbour doing a serious 
stocktake of its foreign policy and 
defence arrangements. The New 
Zealand government is finalising its 
community-based defence inquiry 
which has been overwhelmed by more 
than 6.000 submissions. In October, 
my office is organising a conference in 
Canberra on alternative defence, and 
the keynote speaker will be Dr. Kevin 
Clements, one of the commissioners of 
the New Zealand defence inquiry. 1 am 
convinced that if we seriously hope to 
wreak any changes in the way we and 
our governments consider the defence 
of this country, it can only be achieved 
by continued and informed input from 
the people.
Australia could be a creative 
force in this new mode of 
thinking
At this embryonic stage of 
alternative defence, 1 advocate a step- 
stepby-step strategy of transarmament 
which would lead Australia from our 
new position of self-reliance within 
ANZUS, to defensive defence outside 
ANZUS. to my ultimate goal of 
nonviolent social, or civil defence. In 
tandem with these new defence ideas, 
Australia should be looking to develop 
economic security in the region.
Locked, as we have been, into a 
superpower alliance, we in Australia 
have been isolated in our own region. 
We are considered by most of our 
neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region 
as a major annexe of the United States
— a country whose interests firmly rest 
in the palm of a nuclear superpower. 
Once detached from such an alliance, 
Australia could be expected to be an 
important active participant in our 
region’s economic, political and 
cultural affairs. At the international 
level, Australia, as an independent and 
non-nuclear state has the potential to 
be an  i m p o r t a n t  p l a y e r  in 
strengthening institutions such as the 
United Nations and the International 
C ourt  of Jus tice ,  as well as 
encouraging alternative models of 
conflict resolution thus reducing 
tensions between greater and lesser 
powers.
There is no denying that we live in 
troubled times. With the rapid 
development of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons, as well as a 
frightening proliferation of highly 
"efficient" conventional weapons, the 
world must make a determined effort 
to explore alternative ways of 
resolving international conflict. My
hope and vision is for Australia to bea 
creative force in this new mode of 
th inking . G row ing out of the 
restrictive ANZUS alliance into more 
tailor-made defence and foreign 
policies, Australia would emerge as a 
benchmark for other “bloc” nations, 
both East and West, to follow suit 
between and beyond the blocs. Alter 
almost 200 years of dependence on 
great and powerful friends and the 
misguided glamour-image of the 
Australian Digger going off to fight 
other nations’ wars, it is time this 
country reclaimed its sovereignty.
The bicentenary is a gooc 
opportunity to challenge Australians 
with the concept of real independence 
and fo r  us to learn a little 
neighbourliness towards nations in 
our own Asia-Pacific region — a 
relationship we have shamefully 
neglected for 200 years. I work for the 
day when the sun will rise on a 
selfreliant, independent Australia ... 
not as a European outpost, nor as thr 
51st state of the USA.
JO VALLENTINE is an independtn 
Senator from Western Australia.
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THE POPULAR IS PLURAL: 
Creating a Left Political Culture
I Colin Mercer
Politici and the pleasure principle: The Soapbox ( ircui
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This is not an article about cultural politics. It is, in the first instance, about a more extended concept of culture than the one we are more accustomed to. By 
implication, the concept of 'the political’ which goes with it 
is also more extended. These ‘extensions' — my main 
argument goes — are increasingly necessary in the 
consolidation, formation and re-formation of a popular 
theoretical, intellectual and cultural base for socialism in 
Australia. If the argument can be said to have one overriding 
aim then that is for us to develop a confidence and expertise 
in the procedures of ‘agenda-setting’ on social, economic 
and political issues rather than a reliance on the politics of 
the defensive knee-jerk.
What would it take to define, form or even reform the 
elements of a left political culture? We need to ask first, 
perhaps, what exactly is a political culture since theconcept, 
after a period of disuse, seems to be creeping back by stealth 
or by explicit intervention into the language of left debates. 
Secondly, we need to ask, does the left have one and what is 
it like? Thirdly, if we do have one, then what, with ‘renewal’ 
and ‘prospects’ in mind, would be the conditions for its 
reformation?
The Broad Left Conference had a session entitled 
‘Political Culture' which was actually about cultural 
politics, which is something different. If I explain, briefly, 
how they are different, then perhaps I can mount an 
argument about why I think that the concept political 
culture -  or at least the areas that it attempts to designate -  
might be important for debates about the future of socialism 
in Australia.
Cultural politics is committed to the politicisation of 
culture: it insists that existing forms of culture — film, the 
fine arts, television, literature, theatre — do not provide 
innocent forms of recreation and pleasure. Cultural forms 
are, however attenuated and mediated they might be, 
essentially ideological by nature. Representations of, 
variously, national history, women. Aborigines, human 
nature in cultural forms are seen as having distinctive 
ideological effects. The aim of a cultural politics is to 
intervene in these forms of representation, to refuse them, to 
provide alternative forms and images and ways of writing. 
Cultural politics interrupts the dominant ideology at those 
points — in cultural forms — where they appear to be most 
natural and spontaneous and therefore most effective as a
X jm  o o t m
Festivah have a surplus of meaning: baying an ice cream at Sydney's Royal Easter Show.
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A dialogue between politics and popular pleasures: 
the fibrt Kiss o f the Spiderwoman.
sort of unconscious substratum of the dominant culture 
This is a necessary and strategic form of intervention but, for 
reasons that I will argue in more detail below, it is restricted 
in its aims and. indeed, pace the proponents of cultural 
revolution, only one very small part of what needs to be a 
much larger and more sophisticated project. Cultural 
politics, on the whole, tends to work on a fairly restricted 
definition of culture; that of, as Raymond Williams 
describes it. ‘the works and practices of intellectual and 
especially artistic activity’.1 Turn to the reviews pages of 
Tribune and you will see what 1 mean: books, fringe theatre, 
radical film. Rarely is there anything on, for example, sport, 
popular television or mainstream entertainment film. OK, 
so we recognise that we live in a dominant culture and that it 
is important to bring alternative forms to people's attention 
but the danger is that in carving out that worthy 
oppositional niche we might also be confining ourselves to 
it, that the ‘fringe’ might stay precisely that. Cultural 
politics, as currently practised, is always in danger of 
becoming a rather sterile avant-guardism or at best a politics 
of pure interruption. More of this argument later.
Cultural politics, as currently practised, is always 
in danger of becoming a rather sterile avant- 
guardism
Let me explore now the concept of ‘political culture 
and suggest why, in the face of cultural politics it might turn 
out to be a more useful concept. Firstly, the term culture 
refers here not to works and practices in any ‘artistic’ sense, 
but rather to a more ‘anthropological’ sense of the term as 
the distinctive forms, practices and techniques of, broadly, a 
’way of life’. That is, 1 would suggest, more appropriate for 
our purposes despite its rather amorphous nature. It has at 
least the redeeming feature of being broader in its 
application and not something which is only talked about in 
the reviews pages ol newspapers.
But there is a problem with the history of the concept of 
political culture which, as Tim Rowse clearly demonstrated 
a few years back,* has a dubious heritage in so far as it 
emerged from a combination of behaviourist theory and 
sociology as a way of explaining, in post-war social science 
and political theory, the essential pragmatism of Australian 
political attitudes. It was a term deployed by political 
theorists and taken up by politicians to both theorise and. of 
course, consolidate in a national mentality, the essential and 
immutable elements of consensus in Australian society. It 
could be wheeled on to explain the nature of voting patterns, 
of political parties, the arbitration system and much more. 
In contemporary mainstream political science, the concept 
is still used to explain, for example, the ‘countrymindedness’ 
of Queensland voters or their predisposition to 
authoritarian forms of government.3 It was and is a term 
which ignores a great deal, not least explicit areas of conflict 
and contestation over class, race or gender which, being on 
the margins as the political theorists thought, really did not 
significantly  affect the na tu re  of the essential 
predispositions’, the mental attitudes, the apparently 
permanent psychological orientations ol the Australian
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people. To frame a consensus, as we well know from more 
recent uses of the term, you have to exclude or marginalise 
more troubling conflicts from the picture.
Given alt these problems associated with the concept 
political culture, why bother with it at all? Why is the term 
enjoying something of a resurgence and why am I prepared 
to argue that it might have some use in debates on the future 
of socialism. My answers to these questions are tentative but 
nonetheless insistent. They are both theoretical and more 
immediately political. Let me take the political point first.
The emergence of an increasingly well-organised and 
persuasive New Right committed to reforming ‘attitudes', 
winning ‘hearts and minds' and setting the agenda for new 
forms o f ‘common sense' by engaging in controversies over 
the family, education, morality, the nature of economic 
organisation and its concomitant field o f ‘rights’and ‘duties’ 
seems to me to indicate something of an assault not sim ply at 
the level of political theory or economic rationalism but also 
and, perhaps, most doggedly, at the level of popular opinion 
and beliefs. OK, you might say, we can recognise this, but 
what does it Have to do with the notion of political culture?
To answer this, it might be useful to consider one 
definition of the concept which focusses not so much on the 
way it is deployed as an instrument of consensus politics as 
on what its basic analytical purpose is:
the subjective perception o f  history and politics, the fundamental 
beliefs and values, the fo c i o f  identification and loyally, and the 
political knowledge and expectations which are the product o f  
specific historical experience4
Now, it might be objected that this is what marxists have 
always called ideology. Fair enough, but the problem with 
the concept of ideology is the theoretical baggage it carries
Popular beliefs can be dismissed as ideology, as a 
sort of veil pulled over the eyes of the people ... to 
keep them dumb or keep them amused
with it from the nineteenth century. It brings with it a sense 
of falseness, of illusion, of not seeing the real conditions. 
Popular beliefs can be dismissed as ideology, as a sort of veil 
pulled over the eyes of the people by the dominant class 
either to Keep them dumb or keep them amused. Not 
surprisingly, when you begin to speak of ideology as a form 
of political persuasion, people are either offended or bored. 
This is partly because we tend to think of ideologies as 
purely forms of belief at the level of ideas, in the head and 
not as deeply sedimented, 'practical' forms of common 
sense, as what Gramsci called ‘practical ideologies' which 
‘organise’ human masses, and create the terrain on which 
people move, acquire consciousness of their position, 
struggle, etc.5 This is, I think, a more useful definition of 
ideology (retaining theterm itself fora moment); it insists on 
its practical, rooted, organisational capacities, on its ability 
to be formative and active rather than purely reflective. It 
insists also on its popular nature, its depth and resilience. 
This is a terrain which the New Right takes seriously. In 
another but not unrelated context, Stuart Hall has argued, 
via Gramsci, that
What is at issue here is the transformation o f  those 'practical 
ideologies' which make the conditions o f  life intelligible ... and 
which exercise a practical and material force by organising the it 
actions. What is at issue is the production ... o f  new kinds oj 
'common sense'.6
Read Katharine West closely and you will see that she is not 
writing as a Professor of Political Science but, rather, as a 
‘professor’ of a form of political anthropology. She is I 
concerned, perhaps more persuasively than any other 
exponent of the New Right in Australia, precisely with those 
aspects of political culture which would fall under the 
heading of subjective perceptions, fundamental beliefs, toci 
ol identification and loyalty and common sense, much more 
than she is with taking on heropponents ‘intellectually’. She 
is able, in her own terms, and by recognising both the 
breadth of the terrain which the notion of political culture 
designates, and the complexity of 'subjective' factors 
involved, to extend her political mode of address much 
beyond the spheres of economic and political theory. Thai, 
if you like, is the immediate political reason for my 
argument. But an engagement with the notion of political 
culture has, I would argue, a more long-term purchase in 
prospects for renewal and in our attention to putting our 
own political culture in order
While the left has spent nearly twenty years 
wondering what ‘the personal is political'actually 
means ... the New Right have been getting on with 
doing it
In different terms to those envisaged by the first users ol 
the concept of political culture there is a growing 
recognition that what, for want of a better world, we can caii 
the ‘subjective’ side of politics — areas of choice, personal 
dispositions and preferences, gender and sexuality concerns 
over individual privacy and legal protection of the person 
separate and quite distinct spheres of value are becoming
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increasingly important. While the left has spent nearly 
twenty years wondering what ‘the personal is political’ 
actually means, or interpreting it in unduly narrow and 
uniform ways, the more perceptive proponents of the New 
Right have been getting on with doing it — with 
personalising the political and politicising the personal. 
Questions of ‘lifestyle’, getting government 'off our backs’, 
fending for yourself. Right to Life, and so on; these are the 
markers of a personalist politics which confronts head on 
the area of subjectivity, of the ethical and moral spheres 
about which the left has had comparatively little to say. 
Occupying our little oppositional or ‘alternative* niche, we 
have tended to operate on the ‘Archimedes principle’ of 
politics; find a point outside the world with a sufficient lever 
and a correctly placed fulcrum and you can move that 
world. The trouble is, of course, that the left, like 
Archimedes, would be all alone out there.
This, of course, is something of a caricature but, like all 
caricatures, it attempts to highlight a traif, a tendency. There 
are notable exceptions to the Archimedes Principle in, for 
example, the women’s movement, which has engaged 
directly not only in critique of existing attitudes — that by 
itself would be no better than what I have been criticising in 
the left as a whole — but also in the transformation of 
elementsof the political culture — forms of identification, 
loyalties, subjective perceptions and so on. The 
transformation of a cultural critique into forms of political 
action and the formation of specific policies and legislative 
imperatives; this is the crucial move from a cultural politics 
to a political culture. There is a difference however: the 
women's movement can identify its main and primary 
constituency — women. The left, the socialist movement.
has more of a problem here. What exactly is its 
constituency? The working class? Working people? Workers 
by hand and by brain? Oppressed people? All of these? If the 
latter is the case, as it probably is since it comprises most of 
the population, then how do we address our constituency?
Part of the answer to this lies in taking seriously areas of 
identification, attitude and belief and to acknowledge that 
they have more than illusory or ‘ideological’ forms of 
existence: that they have popular forms of existence. The 
recognition of ‘the popular’ and a systematic engagement 
with its resilient texture has important implications botrh 
with its resilient texture has important implications both for 
the ways in which we direct our analysis of existing 
conditions and for the ways in which we might want to shape 
a more vigorous, expert and confident left political culture.7
Class ... is proving increasingly difficult to define 
... especially when the adjectives ‘working’, 
‘middle’ or ‘ruling are added to it
The left has historically viewed the ‘popular’ with stern 
suspicion. With faultless dialectical logic, marxists have 
insistently demonstrated that the popular, the people, 
populism are at best illusory forms concealing the realities of 
class and, at worst, the watchwords of fascism and reaction. 
Socialists are, after all, concerned with clas&es — easily 
definable as we used to think — and not with this nebulous 
entity ‘the people’. In fact, the reverse now operates. Other 
political forces are able to make great play of ‘the people’ 
because, although it is difficult to get hold of in an intuitive 
sort of way - -  you and I are people after all. Class, on the
Sport and its fascination are rarely taken seriously by the left.
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other nand, is proving increasingly ditiicult to define even by 
the most skilled practitioners, especially when the adjectives 
‘working’, ‘middle’ or ‘ruling’ are added to it. Class has not 
of course, disappeared; it's more a question of our resources 
and political imagery being no longer adequate to defining 
its place in political processes. Certainly, when the definition 
of the primary components of what you had taken to be your 
political constituency is at stake, then you are in a bit of 
trouble. One thing is sure here, though: we can no longer rely 
on the sort of ecclesiastical condescension with which we hae 
customarily explained to ‘thepeople’that it’s really all about 
class.
Perhaps the logic is not so rigorous any more but it is 
difficult to note a certain legacy ol left suspicion of ‘the 
popular’ in our refusal to engage with what is demonstrably 
popular in Australian culture? If the only occasion for 
saying something about to use the insistent example 
again — sport — is when it is primarily defined in the 
political arena of, say, tours of South Africa or the financing 
of the Sydney Swans by big business. If. in other words, 
sport is reduced to a mere side effect of central political and 
economic issues, and if it is allowed no realm of sufficiency, 
no claim to pleasure by itself, is it any wonder that we tail to 
engage with a dominant element of the national culture? 
With a few exceptions, notably — and ironically — in 
journals directed at mainly academic audiences, serious 
analysis of sport, its effects on our ‘dispositions’ not least 
the disposition to go to a football or netball match rather 
than attend another boring meeting — is significantly absent 
from, and radically impoverishes, current left political 
culture. There is an awful lot, on the ‘subjective’ side of 
politics, that can be said about sport — on codes of 
masculinity, for example, or on its effects on national, 
regional and class and gender identifications or on ‘lifestyle’ 
and the star system a la Gerg Matthews, or on its effects as a 
medium for the ‘New Nationalism’.
The same goes for popular television and film, ignored by 
the left or, at best, construed as a contemporary opiate of the 
masses. All we can do is recommend ‘worthy’ programs on 
the ABC or SBS, or an intensely meaningful and relevant
Carnival at the Sydney Palm Sunday Rallv, 1986.
film at the local art house cinema, pretty much in the manner 
of a wett-meaning parson. We can say nothing about the 
mass audiences for Dallas, the features of indigenous 
programs like Neighbours, A Country Practice, Sorts and 
Daughters, Prisoner. And what about Crocodile Dundee? 
We may not like them or, simply by virtue of attending too 
many meetings, be ignorant of them and other spheres of 
popular pleasure and leisure activities, but let us be very sure 
that the way in which they handle issues such as gender 
relationships, the national character, community politics, 
ethical values, representations o f ‘ordinary folk’and so on is 
much more effective on a daily and weekly basis tnan a 
thousand mass meetings. You don't need to subscribe toany ' 
crude theories of the effects of television on behaviour to 
accept this proposition; the simple fact is that, whatever 
their effects, important elements of political cultures are 
regularly deployed and circulated in these programs; they 1 
are talked about and ‘put on the agenda’ in ways the left 
knows and says little about. Crucially, these areas pose the 
central question of the range of complex and effective social j 
identities suggested by the concept of political culture.
On the basis of these two examples, I would suggest I 
that our current constituency, or at least our ability to 
address a constituency, is impoverished. It is probably ’ 
vacuous to say that our constituency is ‘the people’ bu' we 
should at least initiate and maintain a sustained engagement I 
with ‘the popular’. There is a large and fatal discrepancy 
between the resilient and resourceful fabric of the dominant 
culture and the means we have at our disposal for engaging 
with it. In the absence of such forms of address and 
engagement is it any wonder that both the image and the 
practices of the left are perceived and experiences as severely 
constrained ones? Agendas, meetings, slogans, conspiracies 
and a lot of unwelcome‘soap box’noise operating on a logic 
of illusions and trying lo persuade the people where they 
have got it wrong and what they ought to be doing in the 
evenings or on a Saturday afternoon. Again, I apologise, a 
caricature but certainly, as another session at the Broad Left 
Conference on ‘The Plealsure Principle in Politics’ pointed 
out amid the smirks o f ‘serious socialists’, we (who live in the 
realm of urgent necessity) do have a problem wit hour social 
imagery and our political symbolism.
Putting aside the smirks for a moment, though, let me 
suggest that this ‘pleasure principle’ or whatever you want 
to call it is crucially related to the questions that I have raised 
above concerning our engagement with the forms of populai 
culture. 1 can best do this by illustrating an experience from 
the UK in 1977. That year was, as you may remember, the 
year of the Queen's Jubilee. The most memorable image that 
I have of this was the glum faces of the left as they witnessed 
what they thought was their natural political constituency in 
working class communities organising street parties ana 
festivals and festooning the streets and neighbourhoods 
with bunting. The care-worn left stood back, looked of 
disapprovingly and mumbled things like ‘stuff the Jubilee’ 
or ‘down with the monarchy’. For ‘serious socialists’ there 
could only be one pessimistic meaning to this; the masses 
were in thrall to a monolithic royalist ideology. Bui, as Latin 
American friends more familiar with the nature of popular 
festivals pointed out to me at the time, the meanings of these 
celebrations were not exhausted by the fact that their
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explicit object was the celebration of the Silver Jubilee of the 
Queen and its official train of reactionary national 
pageantry. Celebrations, festivals — in the manner of the 
Italian Communist Party's national and regional Feste 
dell'Unita — have a surplus of meaning beyond their 
immediate objects. They are occasions for establishing, 
remiorcing, and furthering community values, values of 
solidarity and of locality and, crucially, of a range of social 
identities. Neighbourhoods which had forgotten that they 
| were neighbourhoods were re-established more in spite of 
than because of the explicit and official intentions of the 
celebrations. At a broader level it celebrated certain features 
of both local and national membership, kinship and 
citizenship which are not at all defined purely by the 
existence of a monarchy. The British Communist Party at 
the time took advantage of this ‘surplus’ of meanings and 
organised a ‘People’s Jubilee’which turned out, in fact, to be 
the largest social gathering of the British left since the war. A 
momentary indication, perhaps, that in engaging with ‘the 
popular’ we will need to get our hands ‘dirty’ by dealing with 
poDular pleasures but might come out looking brighter and 
less jaded than we do now.
Over the next couple of years we are going to be 
confronted with this problem on a grand scale in Australia 
because of the advent, in 1988, of the Bicentenary 
celebrations. We have just witnessed how, in the USA, a 
potent and monumental symbol such as ‘Liberty’ is all too 
easily appropriated to a Reaganesque design. What are we 
going to do about our own forthcoming national 
celebrations? How are we to participate in the shaping of a 
national identity at the level of popular symbols and 
sentiments. Are we to leave this to the corporate 
imagination of the Quiet Achiever? Are we to celebrate a 
tradition of unity or diversity? How will the national 
image be shaped ethnically — a celebration of costumes and 
and ‘traditions’ in a sort of vast national museum? 
Selfcongratulation or critical scrutiny? Clearly, the role of 
the Aboriginal peoples will be crucial in this if they decide to 
participate but in addition to this we cannot afford to stand 
on the sidelines and watch the composite national image 
being put together as if it had nothing to do with us, as if it 
was just another show for the dominant culture, and as if, 
finally, we were outside of that dominant culture. As if 
dominance were purely an issue of imposition "from above’ 
and not also a signal of some form of acceptance ‘from 
below’, however negotiated and attenuated that acceptance 
might be.
On this last point — the dominant culture — we need, 
as I have suggested above in relation to sport and the media, 
to develop much more sophisticated lines of engagement 
and argument. The notion of a ‘dominant culture’ is itself, 
perhaps, a useful abstraction but one which it is quite 
difficult to identify, rather like the ‘dominant ideology’. 1 am 
not arguing that there is no such thing as dominance; it is 
just that when the adjective is applied to complex area > like 
culture and ideology, it tends to convert them into 
monoliths and, at the same time, to suggest that we who can 
identify it are somehow outside of it, in a purely critical 
relationship of opposition. Archimedes again. So how 
should we approach or, indeed, attempt to identify what we 
customarily refer to as the dominant culture?
The normal way of doing this is to identify its 
attributes. Let's take a broad selection and say that it is 
cap ita lis t ,  bourgeois ,  ind ivdualis t ic ,  com petitive, 
patriarchal, racist, and neo-colonial. All of these are no 
doubt accurate in their own ways and in their specific fields 
of reference. The problem is, however, that they are 
ultimately only describing components of the dominant 
culture. Except by some notion of imposition by the 
dominant classes, this form of argument says nothing much 
about how this combination of attributes became dominant. 
This part of the argument is left to the assumption that, 
under capitalism, there is a certain logic which dictates that 
given ideas will come to dominate. This, of course, is not 
unlike that other, earlier, conception of political culture 
which identifies the essential attributes of Australian society 
in order to organise them into a monolith called consensus.
Central to the formation of a left political culture 
would be the noise of the frantic sharpening of our 
analysis
But whether the monolith is called consensus or class 
struggle, it remains, nonetheless, a monolith. In these forms 
of analvsis, the question remains as to how  particular 
‘subjective perceptions’ became established in the ways they 
did, and how  these perceptions played an important role in 
sedimenting forms of social identity, beliefs, loyalties and 
political knowledges. In the face of this formidably complex 
array of questions we have been accustomed to using rather 
blunt and heavy forms of analysis. Central to the formation 
of a left political culture would be the noise of the frantic 
sharpening of our analyses.
If we are to retain some usefulness from the concept of 
political culture, some emphasis on how forms of social 
identity are not reducible to simple origins in class, 
consensus or capitalism, then there isa strong argument for 
pluralising the concept, in speaking of a range of political 
cultures, elements of which may be in conflict and 
contestation within the national culture. Certainly, there are 
preferred and, if you like, dominant arrangements within
Popular movies are generally construed as contemporary 
opiates of the masses: Star Wars.
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that culture, preferred and dominant forms of identification 
which are grounded firmly within the popular imagination, 
but the important thing is that we recognise that this is a 
complex and plural form of arrangement in the light of 
which a not<on like th e ‘dominant culture’might seem a little 
inadequate. The women’s movement has repeatedly 
emphasised that gendered forms of subordination cannot be 
explained away by the existence of capitalism and nor, 
consequently, do they automatically disappear when 
capitalism does. The same is certainly true of racism and the 
persistent theme of individualism against which, we have to 
acknowledge, the counter position of the experience of 
forms of collectivism has not been resoundingly successful. 
Australia is a composite of political cultures, a field of 
contesting positions and identities in which some become 
dominant, others subordinate or marginalised. That is not a 
once and for all situation describing the baselines of 
'national character’ or the ‘class basis'; it i s , precisely, a field 
of forces in which it is possible to intervene provided that we 
have adequate means for intervention.
The concomitant to this argument about making our 
arguments, forms of analysis and subsequent procedures of 
policy formation more sophisticated is to acknowledge an 
important point made recently by Michael Rustin in his 
argument for forms of ‘complex equality':
The more prosperous and seemingly pluralistic society has become 
in its life-styles, the more difficult it has been fo r  socialists to defend  
egalitarian ideals against the imputation that they would enforce 
an unwanted uniformity1
More directly relation to questions of economic planning, 
Rustin goes on to argue that
Visions which conceive the abolition o f  a single dominant fo rm  o f  
inequality — such as the replacement o f  the market by central 
economic planning  — are often blind to the characteristic 
inequalities o f  the alternative form . Even arguments fo r  more 
extensive fo rm s o f  participatory democracy — fo r  the 
transparency o f  social decision making, as it is sometimes called— 
often take a simplistic view o f  what could possible be 'transparent'. 
A n y rrodem  society has to have innumerable specialisms, many 
centres o f  value and decision, and therefore many competing 
interests, and socialist politics m ust now take account o f  these 
fa c ts  *
Rustin is confronting here quite simply the whole nature of a 
socialist vision, the whole basis, if you like, of a left political 
culture. It is difficult to deny the power of this argument 
even though it entails the unloading of a good deal of 
ideological and political baggage. The commitment to a 
pluralist socialism, the recognition of a diversity of interests 
and the concomitant requirement of the development of 
levels of sophistication in analysis, range of engagements 
and policy formation are all elements which, in our current 
left political culture, are floating around in rather disjointed 
ways, some partial, some more fully developed. If we could 
find ways of strategically developing and uniting these 
expertises, commitments and more localised skills in a 
common program of socialist renewal, then we would be 
talking about a vigorous and effective left political culture. 
This would entail, in turn, the formation of a diversified 
theoretical and intellectual base for socialism in Australia;
intellectual, that is, not in terms of the powers of ‘pure 
thought’ but at the level of organisation, policy formation 
and decision making procedures in all fields.
It would requirealso the unloading of a good deal of the 
baggage o f ‘class nostalgia'and frequently pervasive fomu 
o f ‘workerism*. It would certainly mean sharpening up some 
of our present toots of analysis but also, and perhaps more 
important, the development of new forms to match the 
growing technical and ideological sophistication of forces 
currently dominant or emergent.
Our range of knowledge needs to be more specific; we 
need to know at least as much about the workings of local 
government as we do about the global economic crisis and 
international politics (a common problem of the left, this) 1 
We need, developing these resources, to get far away from 
the mentality of the ‘ginger group’; to know more about the
We need ‘technicians’ rather than prophets
complex features of specific and regional political cultures, 
to know why, for example, Joh Bjelke-Petersen is popular 
without recourse to demeaning platitudes about ‘The Deep 
North’ and we need to engage, much more insistently and 
productively, with the major themes of popular and national 
culture with forms of collective memory and self-definition 
without reducing them to excrescences of a capitalist 
controlled media.
And we need, finally, not so much a Vision’ of an 
alternative society as a set of working principles for iht 
qualitative transformation of current forms of social and 
economic organisation. We need 'technicians' rather than 
prophets.
This, of course, is an elaborate range of demands but no 
apologies should need to be made for it.
1. Raymond Williams, Keywords, Fontana, London, 1976, p.80
2. Tim Rowse. 'Political Culture: A Concept and its Ideologues’in Graeme 
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MAKING WOMEN MAD: 
Women, Crime and Madness
Denise Russell
S exist assumptions pervade the areas o f  psych iatry and criminology, and they have an 
important influence in reinforcing sex - 
role stereotypes in general. These 
sexist assum ptions also speak 
specifically to the women's movement 
when feminists are branded as 
irrational, and as responsible for the 
increase in the type and amount of 
crimes committed by women.
Steven  G o ld b e rg ,  in The 
inevitability o f  Patriarchy, attacked 
fem in is ts  f o r  t h e i r  s u p p o s e d  
irrationality:
The alacrity with which fem inists invent 
some fa c ts ' and reject or accept others on 
the basis o f  their emotional appeal is 
illusion in the guise o f  intellectual 
investigation. Invocation o f  this illusion as 
rationalisation is self-indulgence parading 
as virtue. There is no doubt that American 
society demands some new answers 
quickly. But the readiness o f  increasingly 
large numbers o f  radicals to translate 
nearly any new idea immediately into
action does not demonstrate rational 
response not even pragmatic desperation 
but betrays an emotional development so 
stunted that they are forced  to navigate life 
on one engine.1
Also relevant are some recent 
studies which reveal that "left-of- 
centre" political deviance is regarded 
by mental health workers as more 
indicative of maladjustment when the 
purported parent is female than 
male"2.
Not only are feminists accused of 
irrationality or maladjustment, there 
is also a growing assumption in 
writings on criminology that the
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women's movement is a threat to the 
stable character of female criminality.3 
This was put quite nicely by a Sydney 
veteran detective commenting on 
Sydney’s first all-female bank robbery 
in June this year. (In every other case 
recorded, women bank robbers have 
worked with a male accomplice.) He 
said “It’s a new fashion and a sign of 
the times — anti-male discrimination.
My emphasis will be on sexist 
assumptions that relate to notions of 
women’s sanity or insanity or 
criminality — not because the other 
areas such as treatment are not 
i m p o r t a n t  b u t  b e c a u s e  t im e  
considerations force me to limit the 
field.
Firstly , sexism comes into 
definitions of mental health in women. 
Numerous psychological studies have 
pointed out that what, in the West, is 
generally regarded as the woman's 
role, happens to coincide with what is 
regarded as mentally unhealthy. This 
relationship appears to hold for people 
unconnected with mental health work 
and for professional mental health 
workers. Broverman and others, in a 
1970 paper, reported on a study done 
with a group of 79 clinicians: 
psychologists, psychiatrists and social 
w orkers.  They found tha t  the 
clinicians strongly agreed on the 
behaviours and attributes which 
characterise a mentally healthy man, a 
mentally healthy woman, or a 
mentally healthy adult independent of 
sex.4 The descriptions of a healthy 
adult independent of sex closely 
matched the description of a healthy 
man but not that of a healthy woman. 
This confirmed the notion that a 
double standard of health exists for 
men and women, i.e. the general 
standard of health is actually applied 
only to men, while healthy women are 
perceived as significantly less healthy 
by adult standards. Clinicians are 
significantly less likely to attribute 
traits which characterise healthy 
adults to a woman than they are likely 
to attribute these traits to a healthy 
man. These differences parallel the 
sex-role stereotypes in the West and 
also relate to what is socially valued. 
According to the Broverman study 
healthy women differ from healthy 
men by being more submissive, less 
independent, less adventurous, more 
easily influenced, less aggressive, less
competitive, more excitable in minor 
crises, having their feelings more easily 
hurt, being more emotional, more 
conceited about their appearance, less 
objective, and disliking maths and 
science. In general, these are traits that 
are devalued and, hence, the authors 
argue, the judgments involve a 
powerful, negative assessment of 
women5.
These results were confirmed in a 
study reported in 1972 involving 982 
subjects, both men and women, 
married and single, from different age 
groups, and education ands religious 
backgrounds3. Such studies reveal that 
women are caught in an impossible 
situation. If a woman breaks out of the 
female role she may be regarded as 
mentally unhealthy as she is not 
fulfilling her role, but if she stays 
within the role she may be regarded as 
mentally unhealthy on an adult 
standard.
The Broverman studies have been 
criticised, but their general direction 
and tenor have been supported in later 
research. Some authors have made 
particular mention of the “Catch 22” 
situation that exists for women: "The 
very state of being a woman, it has 
been argued, contains so many 
contradictions and so much suffering 
that what appears  as deviant 
behaviour is, in fact, an unwillingness 
or an inability to fit the oppressive 
stereotype of health"6. As Marcie 
Kaplan suggests, the double bind that 
exists here could itself drive a woman 
crazy. Other research has indicated 
that biases relating to class, skin 
colour, or sexuality may interact with 
a sex-role bias.7
A variety of explanations has 
been proposed for the existence of 
different attitudes towards the mental 
health of women and the mental health 
of men. Such explanations «ry to give 
an answer to the question of why sex 
roles are the way they are. There is not 
space to do justice to these issues here. 
One interesting approach appeals to 
the early relationship between mother 
and child with the need for males to 
reverse their early helplessness and 
dependency on a powerful female 
object. This may be tied in with 
fantasies about women's destructive 
power®. Sexism also comes into 
definitions of mental ill-health. 
Studies made prior to 1980 showed
that women who are performing well 
in the temale role by revealing 
em otiona l  responsivity , naivete, 
dependency and childishness could 
have been subject to the diagnosis of 
hysteria*.
In 1980, a new diagnostic scheme 
was accepted by most western 
countries — Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, Third 
Edition (DSM-1II). It has dropped the 
label of “hysteria” and replaced it by 
“Histrionic Personality Disorder”, a 
disorder which is mainly diagnosed in 
women. We can compare the elements 
of the description of this disorder with 
the description of a mentally healthy 
woman that emerged from the 
Broverman studies and a very close 
overlap is revealed.
DSM-fU descriptions
self-dramatisation, e.g. exaggerated 
expression of emotions
overreaction to minor events
i r r a t i o n a l ,  an g ry  o u tb u r s t s  or 
tantrums
vain and demanding
dependent, helpless, constantly 
seeking reassurance
Brov.*£man et al descriptions
being more emotional 
more excitable in minor crises 
more excitable, more emotional, 
less objective
m o r e  c o n c e i t e d  a b o u t  their 
appearance
more submissive, less independent, 
less a d v e n tu r o u s ,  m ore  easily 
influenced
It would seem then that if we make it as 
a mentally healthy woman we are 
simultaneously fitting the diagnosis of 
“Histrionic Personality Disorder” —
AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW 21
i.e. a form of mental ill-health; or if we 
ire not caught by that, there are two 
jther diagnoses, in the new Scheme, 
which are also supposed to apply 
mainly to women and which also seem 
to be very close to the descriptions 
clinicians accept of “mentally healthy 
women”. These are the borderline 
personality  d i s o r d e r  an d  the 
dependent personality disorder. The 
“borderline personality disorder” is 
characterised by “instability in a 
va r ie ty  o f  a r e a s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
interpersonal behaviour, mood and 
self-image. No single feature is 
invariably present”10 Part of the 
definition of a mentally healthy 
woman was that she was “more 
emotional, more excitable, and more 
easily influenced”, “Instability”, the 
defining m ark  of “ B o rd e r l in e  
personality disorder” might not differ 
from these features that characterise a 
mentally healthy woman.
There are similar problems with 
the d e p e n d e n t  p e r s o n a l i t y  
classification. This diagnosis  is 
supposed to apply to a person who 
passively allows others to assume 
responsibility for major areas of her 
life because of an inability to function 
independently; one who subordinates 
her own needs to those persons on 
whom she depends in order to avoid 
any possibility of having to rely on 
herself and one who lacks self-
It looks as though women are 
crazy by definition and the 
lead ing  e x p e r ts  in the  
psychiatric Held are very happy 
to keep it that way
confidence peihaps regarding herself 
as helpless a n d  s tu p id .  This 
description is also very close to the 
description given of a mentally healthy 
woman.
Marcie Kaplan elaborates on the 
subjectivity o f  the descrip tion  
"dependent personality disorder” 
pointing out three major assumptions: 
(1) that dependence is unhealthy; (2) 
that extreme dependency in women 
marks an individual dysfunction 
rather than merely rellecting women's 
subordinate social position; and (3) 
"that whereas women's expression of
dependency merits clinicians'labelling 
and concern, men's expressions of 
dependency (e.g. relying on others to 
maintain their houses and take care of 
their ch ildren) does not". She 
challenges these three assumptions. 
The head of the team who designed the 
new diagnostic scheme, Robert 
S p itz e r ,  has  re s p o n d e d ,  q u i te  
inadequately, by merely pointing 
outthat the description is open enough 
to cover dependency in males as well as 
in females. This argument concerns 
the challenge to the third assumption 
but it does not counter Kaplan’s point 
that specific male behaviours are often 
no t  a c k n o w led g ed  to involve 
dependency when they are just as good
candidates for this description as 
certain female behaviours. Kaplan's 
challenge to the first two assumptions 
is simply ignored.11
In summary, it looks as though 
women are crazy by definition and the
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leading experts in the psychiatric field 
are very happy 10 keep it that way.
Over the last ten years or so there 
has been a broadening and an 
entrenching of the assumption that 
mental illness or mental disorder is 
biologically based. Yet, in 1986, this 
assumption still remains speculative in 
the sense that there is no consistent 
body of scientific evidence which 
establishes a biological base for 
psychiatric disorders other than those 
where there is some obvious organic 
fault — such as brain tumours or 
lesions. I will not go into the argument 
for this view here, but there are some 
problems which may be raised with the 
biological orientation independent of 
a specific critique of the scientific 
evidence.
Take, for instance, the category of 
depression — another diagnosis which 
is supposed to apply mainly to women. 
Within psychiatry, depression is 
individualised. It is treated as an item 
of individual pathology, very often 
with a biological base. From an 
alternative perspective, one may see 
depression as a manifestation of a 
social problem. This is not to deny-the 
depressed woman's suffering, but it is
Open-line programs on the 
radio ... have made clear the 
loneliness and frustration of 
suburban housewives
to acknowledge that, in order to 
un d ers tan d  her depression  and 
suffering, we need to examine the 
social context. There are some present 
indications that this alternative 
perspective might have something 
going for it.
There is evidence that social 
discrimination against women and the 
restrictions of the traditional female 
role are related to the incidence of 
depression in women. It is more 
common in married women than in 
women who have never married, or 
who are divorced or widowed. 
Depression is less common in married 
men than in unmarried men. It 
appears then that marriage benefits 
men and harms women. A recent study 
suggests “that women wishing to avoid 
depression should not get married,
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and confiding relationship with 
another person and, if possible, be part 
of the middle class.”12
Information about the Australian 
context is also in line with these 
findings. Open-line programs on the 
radio, at least since the 1960s, have 
made clear the loneliness and the 
frustration of suburban housewives. A 
university survey, conducted in three 
states in 1969. showed that housewives 
suffer more emotional disorders than 
any o ther o ccupa tiona l  group, 
accounting for 83 percent of cases 
detected in the survey.
In 1971, a newspaper report on 
women who married and moved to the 
newer suburbs around Sydney claims 
that a very high proportion began to 
suffer “neuroses” and even more 
severe “mental breakdowns” within a 
year of moving house. This was put 
down to dissatisfaction with the life of 
home and children when other social 
contacts were minimised. Profound 
insights such as "Man is a social 
animal, and so is his wife” and “The 
devil makes work for idle minds" were 
u t te re d  by D r .  B a r ro w ,  th e  
psychological writer in The Sun 
(Sydney). In a study of suicide 
attempts in the western suburbs of 
Sydney in 1971, women outnumbered 
men two to one. Nearly all were 
married and in the 21 -40 year age 
group. The suicides were attributed to 
loneliness and other problems in the 
marriage.
A survey conducted by the 
N ational H ea l th  and  M edica l 
Research Council in 1971, the most 
extensive study of problems of 
“mental health” lo that date, revealed 
that doctors treated twice as many 
housewives for barbiturate and related 
poisonings than they did professional, 
managerial and clerical workers. 
( B a r b i t u r a t e s  w e re  u s e d  as 
tranquillisers.) Dr. Adams of Sydney 
University’s School of Public Health 
and Tropical Medicine, said: “This 
might be taken as a measure of 
deter iorating  mental health  in 
Australian housewives”. A study in 
Victoria in 1971 also showed that 
housewives have a higher rate of 
psychiatric d iso rder  than o ther 
occupational groups.
Another large study conducted in 
1980 co v e r in g  37,678 ad u l ts ,  
conducted by the New South Wales
Health Commission and Medicheck, 
came up with the following findings: 
Twice as many housewives as women 
with jobs outside the home have 
nervous breakdowns; one woman in 
12 and one man in 20 have 
breakdowns; nervous breakdowns do 
not seem to be related to men’s 
occupations.
In 1982, a study done in the 
p sv c h ia t ry  d e p a r tm e n t  of  the
Married women were found to 
suffer from depression more 
frequently than single women or 
than their husbands
University of Sydney backed up the 
overseas studies on depression: 
married women were found to suffer 
from depression more frequently than 
single women or than their husbands. 
Professor Tennant, in reporting on the 
study, claimed that “it has been well 
proven in many studies that women 
have at least twice the level of 
depression and anxiety neuroses as 
men”. He pointed to the uncertainty 
about whether this was due to 
biological or social differences 
between the sexes. On the basis of his 
study and large ones in the United 
Kingdom, he said: “it is apparent that 
a woman’s marital status affects her 
mental health”. Another related 
finding from these studies is that men 
benefited from  having children 
whereas 23 percent of women with 
children had depression problems, 
compared with 11 percent of women 
without children. Professor Tennant 
remarks, “Of course, kids aren’t toxic 
in their own right. They are toxic in 
that they stop a woman having 
employment outside the home”. All 
these findings suggest problems with 
the social role of women.
Research recently completed by 
M o f f i t t ,  a S o u th  A u s t r a l i a n  
psychologist and Eisen, a Victorian 
psychiatrist, purportedly shows that 
women with mental problems are 
more likely to get  ̂married than those 
who do not have such problems; and 
that once married, the high rate of 
mental distress appears to fall. If
women have such mental problems as 
depression prior to marriage, then 
perhaps a key causative factor is not 
the social role that women are 
supposed to perform, but rather a 
biological fault. This research, which 
is out of line with previous findings, 
was funded by F.H. Fauldingand B.P. 
Australia. Obviously, further research 
is needed but, at this point, it is fair to 
say that the view that maaness in 
women is crucially connected with the 
female role, has received a fair amount 
of support.
It cannot be denied that there are 
problems of depression, of anxiety, of 
social 'isolation, of unusual and 
unwanted experiences and so on, and 
it cannot be denied that many of 
these problems surface most visibly in 
particular individuals: but this is not to 
say that these problems are centrally 
located within those individuals. If the 
above comments on depression are 
correct then it may be more accurate to 
locate the problem of madness in the 
re la tionship  between par ticu la r  
individuals and societal norms and 
demands. One indication that this 
might be the right direction to go is the 
utter failure of individualistic attempts 
at cure. The standard treatment for 
depression is d rugs with their  
attendant side-effects. They do not 
solve the problems. When the person 
stops taking the drugs the problems 
reappear; but they act as a temporary 
blind, marginally decreasing the 
amount of discontent, so that efforts 
are not put into changing the broader 
situation, for example, providing child 
care, opening up employment for 
women, changing definitions of 
women, etc.
In summary, modern psychiatry 
is saying that there is a biological 
reality to madness in women. It may be 
one that is there jus' by the very fact of 
being female. Our inherited nature is 
assumed to channel us into ways of 
experiencing and behaving which will 
earn us the label of histrionic 
personality disorder; or, it may be that 
the biological fault is posited as 
specific, e.g. supposed malfunctioning 
of neurotransmitters as the cause of 
depression. In either case, the 
biological reality is unsubstantiated. 
These directions in psychiatry serve to 
reinforce sex-stereotypes and, in a 
particularly dangerous manner, as
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they claim scientific respectability and 
obscure the sexism which imbues most 
aspects of psychiatry’s theory and 
practice concerning women.
A parallel attacK can be made on 
theories about criminality in women 
and the rise in popularity of biological 
explanations. I only have time to give 
some brief indications of how this 
would go.
Sexism comes into ideas about 
women and crime — firstly, in the 
marking off of certain offences as 
female offences and, secondly, in the 
tendency to see the crime as irrational, 
as going against the female role. These 
directions, then, serve to reinforce sex- 
role stereotypes especially if they are 
linked into biological theories.
There is only one crime which is 
sex-SDecific. This is infanticide: when a 
woman by any wilful act or omission 
causes the death of her child under one 
year old because the balance of her 
mind was disturbed by reason of her 
not having fully recovered from the
effect of giving birth to the child. The 
reason why this category applies only 
to women is because of some implied 
biological cause, but this is in fact still 
merely a conjecture. I believe the 
deeper reason for this crime being 
designated as sex-specific is that it cuts 
across the supposed maternal instinct.
Even shoplifting may be seen as 
em erging from  a m ental 
disturbance
There are some other crimes 
which are not sex-specific but where 
female offenders outnumber male 
offenders. These are shoplifting, 
prostitution in adults, and promiscuity 
and “ungovernability" in adolescents. 
Sexist assumptions pervade the way 
these crimes are conceptualised in 
that, if the crime fits the female role, 
the woman may be regarded as
performing a wrong but not irrational 
act. If the woman commits a crime thai 
goes against the female role, the label 
of irrationality is applied.
Women shoplifters steal food 
(usually of little value) and clothes — 
different things from those which men 
usually steal — and their actions are 
quite in accord with women's role as 
providers of food and snappy dressers. 
Thus, their crimes may, in a sense, be 
validated, though they are seen as 
crimes nonetheless. Even shoplifting 
may be seen as emerging from a mental 
disturbance. In these instances, the 
woman will be regarded as suffering 
from kleptomania. Interestingly, in 
the new psychiatric diagnostic scheme, 
when describing kleptomania, the 
authors state, under the heading of 
“Impairment and complications": 
“Impairment is usually due to the legal 
consequences of being apprehended, 
the major complication of the 
disorder"15 Note how legal notions 
become medicalised.
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The other female offences are 
invalidated. They break with the 
female role, and so cannot be the result 
of a rational mind. This applies to 
conceptualisations of prostitution as 
well as to lemale juvenile delinquency. 
Prostitution is commonly viewed as a 
form of sexual aberration — an 
activity that a woman is compelled to 
perform because of her mental 
disturbance, rather than an activity 
rationally chosen. This is true also of 
the ideas about the juvenile female 
crimes.
In a study done of children's 
courts in New York, it was revealed 
that if girls committed acts against 
sexual taboos, or against parents, this 
was enough to lead the probation 
officer to assume that psychiatric help 
was needed, but not so for boys. 
Reporting on this study, in Women, 
Crime and Criminology, Carol Smart 
claims that “This attitude towards 
female delinquency reflects the 
commonly held belief that deviancy by 
a female is a sign of a much deeper 
pathology than deviancy by a male".14
The fact that promiscuity and 
ungovernability in adolescents are 
predominantly temale offences is a 
reflection of attitudes about these 
activities in boys and girls. Sex bias 
determines w hether prom iscuity  
counts as an offence. It is much more 
likeiv to count as one and to be 
punished by institutionalisation if it is 
a girl who is promiscuous. A 
promiscuous boy may not be regarded 
as deviant at all. Similarly, “ungovern­
ability’* may be understood in terms of 
hostility and violence: features which 
may either not be regarded as deviant 
at all in boys or their importance may 
be played down. Thus again, sex-role 
stereotypes might influence whether 
the same behaviour is regarded as an 
offence or not.
The general tendency to see crime 
in women as resulting from a basic 
irrationality or mental disorder has the 
effect of e n t re n c h in g  sex -ro le  
stereotypes; if one is “a real woman" 
one could not possibly behave like 
that.
The t r e a tm e n t  o f  w om en 
offenders is coming into line with these 
ideas  a b o u t  t h e i r  s u p p o s e d  
irrationality. For example, recently, 
the main women's prison in England,
Holloway Prison, was turned into a 
psychiatric institution.
Biological theories have been 
used to try to explain the apparent 
irrationality in female criminality. 
Appeals are made to the true nature of 
women as passive, dependent beings 
with a maternal instinct, and then 
some bioloical impulse or hormonal 
imbalance is thought to cause a 
deviation from that true nature. In line 
with this, a biological explanation is 
presented for the lower incidence of 
crime in women than in men, and to 
explain why there are no great women 
criminals.
It is. of course, undeniable that 
women sometimes commit crimes 
when they are in a d ifferent 
physiological state than previously, 
say, after the birth of a child, but we 
are not forced to conclude that it is the 
physiological change which has caused
A biological explanation is 
p resen ted  for the lower 
incidence of crime in women
the crime. There is a large element of 
conjecture here and just a little 
reflection reveals that this coniecture is 
based on sexism. Similarly, some 
w rite rs  a s se r t  th a t  “ a b n o rm a l  
chromosomal balance is at the root of 
female delinquency".15 This is pure 
invention. There is no scientific 
evidence for such a claim.
This biological orientation within 
theories about crime in women and 
within institutions which treat women 
offenders, though unsubstantiated, 
has very undesirable implications. It 
prevents us from seeing that the very 
description of the girl or woman as 
criminal might simply result from 
sex-role stereotyping, as I tried to 
show for “female juvenile promis­
cuity”. It prevents us from seeing that 
explanations of women's crime in 
terms of social factors might have 
some plausibility e.g. prostitution may 
be looked at. not as a result of an 
abnormal biology, but in terms of 
certain broad social factors such as the 
relatively limited opportunities for 
women to earn a Jiving wage, to win 
promotion, to achieve a secure career 
and  to  becom e e c o n o m ic a l ly  
independent of men. That orientation
certainly seems to lead us into more 
enlightened directions than biological 
theories.
In summary, what I've tried to do 
is to show how certain sexist 
assumptions currently operate in parts 
of psychiatry and criminology and 
within biological approaches in these 
areas, and 1 have also tried to show 
that biological approaches within 
these areas, although not legitimated, 
reinforce these assumptions.
1. S. Goldberg, The Inevitability o f Patriarchy, 
(NY, 1973), 225.
2. A.M. Brodsky and J. Holroyd in American 
Psychologist, vol. 30, 1957, J 175.
3. C. Smart, Women. Crime and Criminology: 
A Feminist Critique (London, 1976), 71.
4.1. K.. Broverman et al, in Journal o f Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, vol. 34. 1970, 1-7,
5. I K. Broverman et al. in Journal o f Social 
Issues, vol. 28, 1972. 59-78.
6. G. Strieker in American Psychologist, vol. 32, 
1977, 14-22: J. A Sherman in A.M. Brodsky and 
R .T . H are-M ustin  (eds) Women and 
Psychotherapy: An Assessment o f Research and 
Practice, (NV, 1980); L.J Jordanova in 
Cambridge Women's Studies Group (eds) 
Women in Society (London, 1981), 102.
7. M. Kaplan in American Psychologist, vol. 38, 
1983, 786-792; S. Briar in Social Work, vol. 9, 
1961, 91-97; P. Chesler, Women and Madness, 
(NY, 1973)206-233; B. Reiss in V, Franks and V. 
Burtle (eds) Women and Therapy (NY, 1974).
8. H E. Lerner, M. Bayes, in E. Howell and M. 
Bayes (eds) Women and Mental health (NY, 
1981). 34, 442.
9. H.E. Lemer in Comprehensive Psychiatry, 
vol. 15, 1974, 157-164.
10. R.L. Spitzer et al. Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual o f Mental Disorders (Washington, 
1980). 321.
11. Spilzer et al, 326; Kaplan, 789-90; J.B.W. 
Williams and R.L. Spitzer in American 
Psychologist, vol. 38, 1983, 796.
12. Howell. 155; Jordanova, 109-110. G. Brown 
et al, in Sociology, vol. 9, 1975, 225-254; M.M. 
Weissman and G.L. Klerman in Women and 
Mental Health, 182-4.
13. Spitzer et al, 293.
14. Smart, 133.
15. Smart, 58.
DENISE RUSSELL teaches in the 
Department of General Philosophy at 
Sydney University.
26 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW
A LEFT WIDE OPEN: 
Alliances and Socialist Strategy
David Burchell
A classic moment of alliance politics: the NSW BLF, 1971-75.
The following article is intended to provoke discussion around aspects of a trend of thought in left politics which, while hardly new in a general sense, has taken 
new directions and gained new emphases in recent years — 
which I will call, for shorthand purposes, ‘the alliance 
strategy'. Briefly expressed, the alliance strategy takes as its 
central reference-point an image of the political canvas
where the radical and progressive forces are linked by i 
system of tacit and explicit alliances developed through the 
processes of day-to-day political activity, and also in the 
cross-fertilisation of political programs and political 
theory. At the same time, it proposes a concept of alliance 
which is far broader and more complex than simple 
programmatic compromises or political deals: one which
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pictures processes of dialogue and communication (and, at 
times, even of struggle)1 as forging links between social and 
political forces and movements, their political and day- 
to-day cultures, and their theoretical traditions. It is, in a 
sense, a generalisation of what we have learnt about the 
nature of political alliances onto the complex terrain of 
society as a whole.
While this is basically a practical strategy, in the sense 
that it seems to have emerged over time as a fact against the 
grain of several of our traditional theoretical assumptions, it 
is one which has considerable consequences for our theory 
as well — even though valuable precedents for it can be 
found in the theoretical writings of Antonio Gramsci and in 
the political writings of other figures such as Togliatti. It is 
also an experience which suggests some lessons for how we 
conceive of the formation and development of our theory 
itself. Eric Aarons put it polemically, but well, when he 
asxed:
But i f  we give up the view that marxism does, or should, or will ( if  
re-interpreted ye t again) provide us with a unitary theory, a total 
explanation, a form ula  fo r  prediction  — will that not stop us fro m  
'getting it all together in our heads' and leave us all at sea?
Not i f  we reject that expectation, and use our theoretical resources 
to help us listen ’ more to practice instead o f  thinking that theory 
can somehow dictate to reality how it m ust behave.2
Nevertheless, this still leaves open the thorny question of 
how and from where we obtain o u r ‘theoretical resources’in 
the first instance. If this is not at the present time a critical 
puzzle, this is very largely because we still have so much 
theoretical catching-up to do.
Now, on the question of the desirability of coalitions or 
alliances among the left and progressive forces on the plane 
of political practice, not many of us, on what could 
reasonably be called the renewable left, are in much doubt. 
Obviously, the left is in a bad way (and this goes for the 
whole left, not merely the organised left) and without some 
forms of alliances and coalitions with like-minded people 
and movements, the left is not only not going to get very far, 
it may, in fact, in the foreseeable future, cease to exist in any 
organised manner at all. But what is in doubt, and what is in 
desperate need of a bit of ‘theory’ in the sense of the word 
outlined above, is how we should conceive of such alliances 
operating, what should be the ground-rules and even, in a 
sense, the morality under which they should be constituted, 
and what, in the first instance, they should set out to achieve.
There are two distinct problems here. The first relates 
to how alliances operate between what might be called the 
traditional left — and in particular the trade union 
movement — and parts of the left outside it; the second to 
how alliances should be constructed in a more general sense. 
The first of these relates largely to ways of looking at 
alliances which are fundamentally hostile to many aspects of 
socialist renewal altogether. The second relates to attitudes 
among members of the organised left who are broadly 
sympathetic to the alliance strategy but who, by dint of their 
political education, force of habit and so on, tend to 
conceive of the strategy in a reductive, hierarchical, or even 
downright authoritarian manner.
The argument against the alliance strategy, in the sense in 
which it is defined above, can take either of at least two 
forms. The first (and more traditional) approach is to assert 
what is called the ‘leading role of the working class' 
(meaning, in fact, the trade union movement), in any 
alliance or coalition between left and progressive forces. 
Now, it bears saying that simply to assert the ‘leading role'of 
anything in this manner is quite meaningless: meaningless 
not because the working class is ‘finished' as a class 
(whatever that might mean) but because, literally, it has no 
practical reference to reality. T h e  working class' (i.e. the 
organised working class) simply acts in any concrete 
political conjuncture as an element of a coalition of forces — 
social, institutional, even cultural — defined by the political 
balance of forces in society as a whole. Obviously, as an 
organised grouping with an enormous amount of muscle, 
the trade union movement has to be an important part of 
any realistic strategy for change. But no power on earth 
can give it some sort of centrifugal force in alliances 
negotiated on the terrain of political activity as we daily 
experience it. ‘Leading roles' are not bestowed from the 
heavens — they are earned.
The second argument against the alliance strategy as 
defined above is a good deal more difficult 10 come to grips 
with. Its key phrase — as canonised in the title of a booklet 
produced by the hard-line wing of the British CP is ‘class 
politics’, though it is far from clear exactly what that means. 
A familiar feature of the ‘class politics' school of thought is 
its propensity to define itself not as a positive approach to 
understanding political reality, but rather by means of a 
primarily negative critique of the alliance strategy. Thus, the 
authors of the Class Politics pamphlet describe the 
theoretical basis of what they describe as the ‘newer left* as 
‘the idea t h a t ... issues such as peace, sexism, racism and law 
and order are not class issues and cannot be fought out as 
class issues'(my emphasis — DB), entailing a strategy based 
upon ‘substituting the politics of new "movements” and 
“forces” for class politics’ and ‘denying that they can be 
adequately located there', and leading to
an incipient liberal pluralism in which the 'new fo rc es 'and indeed 
the labour movement itself become so m any discrete interest 
groups which can only be held together at any one time by a 
populist electoral programme basea on the lowest common  
denominator o f  political acceptability.3
And indeed an obsession with ‘pluralism’, as the perceived 
‘dissolving agent' of an ordered hierarchy of political forces 
such as is allegedly represented by the term ‘class politics', is 
one of the hallmarks of the class politics approach.
Yet, viewed in another light, the class politics approach 
appears not so much as a nostalgic view of socialist political 
strategy, as a theoretical construct serving rather different 
practical ends. On one level, 'class analysis' serves as a 
hammer for beating over the head certain trends in the 
women's movement in recent years which are frankly 
sceptical of the supposed ‘marxist-feminisf synthesis as a 
basis for socialist feminist practice. On another, it serves as a 
Jcind of moral prioritisation of the concerns of the 
traditional left, by the rather oblique device that class 
politics is seen to be effected by bringing the priorities of all
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major participants in alliances to the altar of an 
alreadydefmed class analysis. And, of course, both these 
elements are related: it is precisely the ‘betrayal’ of ‘unity’ 
within the working class (defined as above) that 
contemporary trends in socialist feminism have engendered, 
via their critique of the structures as well as the practice of 
the labor movement, which constitutes the defining case of 
refusal to succumb to the arbiter of class analysis.
In a theoretical sense, this class politics vogue, which is 
itself deeply implicated in what Stuart Hall has aptly 
described as the ‘fundamentalist marxist revival’ is both a 
self-protective response to the bewildering new forms of the 
left's crisis, and a defensive response to the theoretical gulf 
which looms between older styles of politics and the politics 
of newer forces and movements. But, in a practical sense, it 
simply serves to carry on the old vanguardist approaches by 
new means: class politics, like the leading role of the 
working class, is a fount of true consciousness not itself 
amenable to transformation or redirection in the unfolding 
of the alliance process.
The reductionist view of coalition politics runs 
deep through the accumulated processes of 
thought and habit of all of us
The second problem arises among supporters of the 
alliance strategy who tend to reduce it to a mechanical and 
hierarchical process which reproduces many of the least 
attractive features of the existing organised left — and which 
are at least a part of the reason for its waning influence and 
appeal. This kind of approach can take any of a number of 
forms — appeals for coalitions based substantially along 
existing organisational lines, which become (or tend to 
become) mere coantions of convenience for the sake of 
individual issues which are left essentially unrelated to other 
issues; notions of new parties or organisations which 
substantively reproduce existing structures or patterns of 
work, without any conception of the different needs or 
philosophies of groups at present outside such structures; 
and conceptions of alliances or coalitions based upon 
interpretations of programmatic unity which tend to reduce 
the idea of com m on p rog ram s to the lowest- 
common denominator approach. This last tendency is 
especially galling when it is precisely the operation of 
contradictions which socialists schooled in the marxist 
tradition have always felt to be the driving force of practical 
and theoretical advance.
Undoubtedly, it would be easy enough to find broad 
agreement between, say, the trade union movement and 
much of the women's movement, for the proposition that 
‘working class living standards have to be defended and 
improved’. It is much less easy, however, to forge instant 
unity around the question of how, in an economy where 
(whatever the method of ownership of the means of 
production) the total wage bill is subject to definite 
constraints, redistribution within the working class ought to 
be effected, so that the preferential status of men's work can 
be countered. In the words of Anna Coote and Beatrix 
Campbell,
I f  women are to share domestic labour equally with men, then men 
will have to increase their time spent on unpaid work. I f  women an 
to increase the level o f  their earnings to the point where they match 
m en’s, then men's earnings will inevitably decline in relation to 
women's. I f  women are to occupy skilled, higher-paidjobs in equai 
numbers with men, then there are bound to be few er o f  these jobs 
available to men.4
It is difficult to see how what I will term the reductionist view 
of alliance politics can cope with this sort of challenge. 
Where the class politics and leading role approaches try to 
bluff through such contradictions by saying (for instance) 
that industrial militancy is capable of solving all wage 
questions, the reductionist view of alliance politics simply 
remains silent.
But it is impossible to understand the nature of the 
obstacle posed by the reductionist view of coalition politics 
unless it is recognised how deeply it runs through the 
accumulated processes of thought and habit of all of us. As 
was noted in the last issue of A L R , there was more than a 
hint of the reductionist view in the structure of the Broad 
Left Conference. (Although there, at least, there was the 
opportunity for breaking through these letters.) A more 
dramatic example perhaps was the recent proposal for the 
new labour movement weekly 7 Days, which clearly stated 
that its primary role as a labour movement organ was to be 
(as it were) ‘rounded out’ by selective representation of the 
mass social movements — without, of course, giving the 
representatives the ability to upset the apple cart. In the final 
analysis, the reductionist view of coalition politics ( even in 
its most sophisticated forms) tends to defuse the impact and 
the implications of the roles, aims and philosophies of the 
constituent elements in alliances — for instance, by reducing 
them to the status of minority, or single issue, groups which 
are then felt to be somehow ‘all part of the same mass’. Yet it 
is precisely upon the terrain of the autonomy and the 
difference of the constituent elements that genuine, fruitful 
alliances are negotiated and maintained.
For many years, alliances were treated basically as 
expediencies outside the normal ground rules of 
politics
Historically speaking, it has been the reductionist view 
of coalition politics which has dominated the left's 
conception of the role of alliances and alliance strategies. 
For many years, alliances were treated basically as 
expediencies outside the normal ground rules of politics: 
where the out-and-out vanguardist approach had, of 
necessity to be temporarily tucked away in a cupboard, as it 
were - as in the Popular Fronts era.5 Historically, it is as 
close to a strategy of alliances in its own right as we have 
been able to get.
It is no coincidence, then, that the first serious attempts 
at formulating the kind of alliance strategy discussed here 
(and the kind of organisational forms capable of co-existing 
with it) came from outside the political culture of the 
traditional left — which is to say, of course, from within the 
experience of the ‘new’ women’s movement of the 1970s.
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Here the oft-cited classical text is Hilary Wainwright's 
introduction to Beyond the Fragments (1979), although 
perhaps a more developed conception of the same basic 
approach is again provided by Beatrix Campbell:
Alliances are not simply about arithmetic — aggregating groups o f  
people, regarded as minorities, adding them up so that they 
become a majority. That view o f  alliances reduces politics to 
electoral arithmetic. Alliances are political processes which 
transform the constituent p a n s in their encounter with each other. 
They are political dialogues in which the constituent parts become 
both collective agents fo r  change and also the subjects o f  change.6
This is an important concept, and one fraught with 
implications for the rest of our theory. And yet the 
theoretical tools we have inherited from the marxist 
tradition are almost silent on the nature of this kind of
encounter. I would agree with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe in their remarkable recent work on Hegemony and  
Socialist Strategy that a prime reason for this is the 
allpersuasive ‘essentialism’ which has underlain many 
marxist conceptions of the political process — although, as 
will be noted shortly, I have some reservations about other 
aspects of Laclau and Mouffe's approach.7
By essentialism I mean, very broadly, the belief that the 
political process is given structure by an essence or essences 
which have a kind of universal quality independent of the 
existence of the structure itself. ‘Motive forces’, 
determinations in the last or any other instance, ‘objective1 
class interests and so on are ah concepts which have played 
this sort of role in marxist theory from time to time, quite 
independently of the conceptual status of other elements in 
the analysis. And, of course, tod?y the catch-all essentialist 
device is the class politics approach, with its never-ending 
search for an essential ‘class'belongingfor problems, issues 
and movements; to give them a kind of fixity which could 
put them (as it were) comfortingly ‘in the frame’ of our 
inherited assumptions about politics.
While Laclau and Mouffe draw their particular 
formulation of the function of essentialism from the French 
theorist Jacques Derrida and his critique of the structuralist 
trend in academic thought,8 it is equally applicable to less 
rarefied approaches to social theory. The value of this 
general approach is that it ‘frees up’ our theory for a more 
realistic understanding of the political processes we can see 
going on around us every day. Like some of the more fruitful 
trends in contemporary social theory, it demonstrates ‘a 
desire to think in terms sensitive to difference (of others 
without opposition, of heterogeneity without hierarchy)’,9 
thereby demonstrating also an ability to see concepts in 
terms of the irrevocably heterogeneous nature of the forces 
for progressive change in societies like ours and. indeed, the 
increasing cultural and social plurality of the societies 
themselves. In the words of Renato Nicoloni, until recently 
Rome's Communist Councillor for Culture, ‘In cultural 
habits and customs today there no longer exists the 
possibility of organic interpretations of society or values. On 
the contrary, there is a confused, contradictory, uneven 
plurality of wills, cultural expressions, values... and we must 
consider it a positive phenomenon'.10
The problem with Laclau ana Mouffe's approach to the 
question, though, is that once they've dismantled the frame­
work of some of our more stubborn misconceptions of 
politics and hegemony, they remain very vague about how 
to understand concretely the kind of terrain they've opened 
up. In an earlier contribution they described the hegemonic 
strategy a little grandly, as consisting of ‘a vast system of 
alliances that are continuously redefined and renegotiated’11
— a phrase suggestive of perhaps a little too much 
intellectual enthusiasm and too little concrete analysis. In 
short, they seem less interested in their discoveries than in 
the process of discovering itself. So it is probably worth 
while mentioning briefly here — byway of an ending, if not a 
conclusion — a few of the consequences which flow on from 
placing an alliance strategy, shorn of its essentialist features, 
at the centre of our analysis.
One of the most tenacious beliefs of many marxists — 
against all the dictates of our political experience — is that.
Beatrix Campbell.
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by pointing out that people who identify themselves by 
means of particular movements, issues, lifestyles, 
subcultures, and so on which seem to escape the net of the 
traditional concerns of our analysis, are part of the‘broader 
working class’, this somehow explains their senses of 
identity in class terms. The practical correlate of this, of 
course, is the fond belief that if only ‘marginal’ or ‘backward’ 
elements of the population could come to see themselves as 
workers, first and foremost, somehow this would unlock for 
them a ready-made critique of patriarchal, capitalist society
Realistic class politics today lies in understanding 
the experiences by which people identify 
themselves in relation to the larger society
— which they would thereupon seek to overturn. Now, it 
bears mentioning that there are good historical precedents 
for such a situation — the experience both in Australia and 
Western Europe between c. 1850 and the 1920s is an obvious 
one — and in hardly any of these cases did they lead to 
anything resembling a revolutionary situation. But that is, in 
any case, largely beside the point. The real point is that 
realistic class politics today lies in understanding the various 
interlocking, but different, cultural and social experiences 
by which people whom we might classify as part of the 
popular masses identify themselves as standing in a certain 
relation to that larger imagined entity known as society. 
Knitting together the self-perceptions of people's relations
to society is itself a form of alliance-building on the 
ideological plane which helps make sense of what we mean 
by ‘working class’.
On one level this requires ‘a means of grasping not the 
singular meaning (a revolt against capitalism!)’ of people's 
self-identification in the culture of their daily lives, ‘but the 
pluralism of the play of styles, codes and languages which 
can now be seen to constitute the realm of the popular’.11 On 
another, it requires an understanding of the'underlyingdrifi 
of cultural change’, and of the dynamics which have 
produced ‘a more loosely-textured, more diffuse and diverse 
daily experience’13 across the entire span of the social forces 
to which we attach the name of the working class. Put 
simply, it means that we have to seek alliances within the 
working class across lines of connection which have little or 
nothing to do with politics with a capital P. This not only 
means broadening-out our understanding of alliances: it 
also means broadening-out our conceptions of what 
alliances can be negotiated around. Here, an exemplary 
instance of the possibilities of this new conception of 
alliance politics is Britain's late lamented Greater London 
Council, which forged alliances with the voluntary sector, 
with community groups, with grassroots popular music and 
i's supporters and other supposedly apolitical social forces 
through its innovative grants policy.
Probably the most profound and far-reaching 
consequence of an alliance strategy ‘freed-up’ from 
essentialism, though, lies in that cluster of ideas to which we 
commonly give the name ‘hegemony’. Indeed, part of the 
problem of this important concept, as is now coming to be
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realised, is that in a sense it tries to explain too m u c h .]i 
Hegemony has been used, at various different times or even 
at the same time, to explain the ability of a ‘leading force' in 
society to hold together a ruling bloc comprised of 
sometimes quite disparate social forces; to the ideological, 
political and cultural mechanisms by which such cohesion is 
secured; to the political-cultural commonsense by which the 
aims of the hegemonic bloc are generalised to secure the 
support of the broader masses; and also less directly to the 
coercive or juridical mechanisms which may or may not be 
essential to the process, depending upon the nature of the 
society.
By bringing our understanding of alliances and 
essentialism to our thinking about hegemony, however, we 
can quickly discover several things about the idea itself. One 
isthat any realistic account of hegemony has to understand 
that the various elements which go to making up a 
hegemonic consensus or way of looking at the world are 
drawn from the whole range of experiences within people’s 
social existence, and not merely from the agenda of politics 
with -a-capital-P. This is simply the extension of the insights 
which alliance politics provided into the politics of ‘class'. 
And, by the same token, the ideas underpinning such a 
hegemonic consensus are always far wider and more 
sophisticated than the tunnel vision which usually goes by 
the name of political ideology.
In an earlier incarnation, Laclau and Mouffe used to 
argue that hegemony was the articulation of a central 
‘hegemonic principle’ with other ideas and values (what they 
called ‘popular-democratic’ as opposed to ‘class’ ideologies). 
But, of course, this is in itself a kind of essentialism, in that it 
assumes again that the essential element — in this case the 
hegemonic principle — stands outside of or prior to the 
other, contingent, elements. It is a much more adequate 
expression of the insights of the alliance strategy simply to 
view the so-called hegemonic principle as itself a contingent.
The idea of a unified socialist commonsense ... 
runs against the grain of all of the insights of 
alliance polifics
historical tradition — a tradition which socialists have 
inherited from earlier generations of socialists, which has 
J  often been transformed, and which will continue to be 
transformed, in its encounters with other radical or 
liberatory sets of values and beliefs.
Nor is a hegemonic commonsense or way of looking at 
the world simply a matter of connecting up different views of 
politics, seen as representing the perspectives of different 
social forces or movements, into some sort of seamless 
whole. Rather, a hegemonic commonsense is one which is 
1 able to come to terms with the irreducible differentness of 
perspectives within a much broader perspective which 
assumes certain shared general values about society, 
democracy, gender, the environment and so on. This is 
neither a good thing nor a bad thing: it is simply an 
observable fact about the nature of beliefs and values within 
a society like ours today, as well as within the left itself. The 
idea of a unified socialist commonsense, like that of a
totalising theory, is one which runs against the grain of all 
the insights of alliance politics.
Finally there is a whole complex of unanswered 
questions around the general problem of the perceptible gap 
(we could almost call it a quantum leap) between the alliance 
strategy as we know it in our experience, and a further stage 
in the strategy which would eventually push society in a 
socialist direction. Put slightly differently, this is the 
problem of how to move from the actually-existing forces 
for social change we have been able to detect at work in the 
last ten to twenty years or so, to a much broader tacit social 
consensus within the popular forces as a whole. (Which is 
not to mention the distinct but related controversies about 
the role of the state, parliamentary democracy, and so on.) 
When it comes to these sorts of quandaries, we are only at 
the beginning of being able to see our way through to 
answers which make sense in terms of the political changes 
we can see going on around us.
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SOCIAL SECURITY: 
Is it secure?
Peter Davidson
I s the Australian Social Security (pensions and benefits) system under threat in a low growth 
economy? The short answer is that the 
system itself will survive, but with 
fundamental changes in the offing. 
Some of these pose a serious threat to 
Social Security dependents — a threat 
of marginalisation.
Last year, the Social Security 
Minister, Brian Howe, announced a 
comprehensive social security review 
to examine retirement incomes, 
benefits for the unemployed and 
income support for children. It was a 
move for positive welfare reform of a 
system set up in the 1940s. Howe is 
now being forced to redirect his 
energies into responding to regressive 
measures coming from the ‘new right’ 
of the Labor Party. Before considering 
these measures. 111 explain the main 
features of the present system.
The Australian social security 
structure is unique in the capitalist 
world. It provides universal payments 
funded by the national government 
from consolidated revenue. This is a 
major advance on European and US 
schemes which are a blend of 
insurance and charity. For those who 
contribute (along with their bosses and 
the state) to a social security fund in 
those countries, there is 'insurance' 
against unemployment, old age, 
sickness and so on. For those who lack 
a s ta b le  em p lo y m en t  h is to ry  
(including many women) there is state 
and private charity provided at the 
discretion of bureaucrats and welfare 
agencies .  T h is  s e t -u p  c lea r ly  
cntrenches class and gender divisions.
In Australia there are flat rate 
payments for all people who meet the 
eligibility requirements. Payment is a
legal right, not a charity. The 
conservatives tried to introduce the 
insurance principle in the '30s. but 
were u nsuccess fu l ;  the  C u rt in  
government introduced the present 
system in 1944.
But there is a catch. The rates of 
benefit are lower than in most OECD 
countries. In Australia, the single 
pension is less than 25% of average 
earnings, while in European countries 
it is generally over 50% of a person's 
past earnings.
In a capitalist society there are 
certain structural limits to social 
security spending. First, poverty is 
created on a wide scale because 
sections of the working class are 
marginalised: they have no work, can't 
work because of a lack of alternative 
child care, or are in and out of low 
paid, temporary work. The greater the 
poverty, the morecostly social security 
becomes, precisely al the time that t ax 
revenues are dropping. Second, there 
are limits (at any given point in time) 
to the extent that capital can be taxed
The Australian social security 
structure is unique in the 
capitalist world.
without threatening profitability and 
the reproduction of the whole 
economic system.
These problems are exacerbated 
by the ‘taxation problem’ in Autralia. 
Australia is a low tax/small public 
sector economy. Of the OECD 
nations, only Turkey^ Greece and 
Spain spend a lower proportion of the 
GDP on the public sector. One 
socialist solution is to tax the wealthy 
but they, and their conservative 
parties, have a buffer /one in the form
of the anti-tax sentiment of many 
working people (or, to be pa-eisc. 
hom e-ow ning working people). 
Australia has a high level of home 
ownership and workers resist paying 
OECD-level taxes when they arc 
heavily ‘taxed' in turn by the banks. 
Although socialists only wish to l ax 
the wealthy heavily, this has been a 
hard message for even the ALP to get 
across to working class home owners, 
and the Liberals have won many 
elections by portraying the ALPasthc 
‘high tax’ party.
It should come as no surprise, 
then, that over over 20 years of 
predominantly conservative rule, the 
Henderson poverty inquiry found, in 
1976. that 15 percent of Australians 
lived under its austere poverty line, 
and placed most of the blame on 
parsimonious social security benefits.
The system also reflects the 
society we live in in more subtle ways. 
Benefits and pensions aren't paid on 
the basis of need. They are paid on the 
basis of employability. People over 60 
(women) or 65 (men) are assumed to 
be retired, and can get the Age Pension I 
subiect to income and assets tests. The 
same goes for invalids, who may 
receive an invalid pension on grounds 
of permament incapacity. Able­
bodied people of ‘working age" get 
unemployment benefits if they prove 
they are available for and actively 
seeking employment,
Women are treated as a special j 
case: it is still assumed they are part of 
a family unit and responsible (or 
raising children. Married women can t 
collect the dole because their 
husband's income is taken into I  
account. A woman is paid supporting 
parent’s benefit if single and caring for 
children; but, as soon as she becomes 
involved with a man, it is assumed he 
will support her financially, and the 
benefit is cancelled.
T h e  W h i t la m  g o v ern m e n t  
attempted to reverse the low tax low! 
spending equation of Australian 
politics, but camc up against a major 
recession in 1974. Slow economic 
growth since then has narrowed tht 
choices on both the expenditure and ; 
taxation sides, giving rise to growing 
pressures for changes in social! 
security. It is no longer a battle over! 
rates of benefit within a fucdJ 
s t ru c tu re ;  the basic  concepts
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underpinning social security arc being 
question from both left and right.
This article discusses four trends 
in social security today: * welfare for 
the needy; * unemployment benefits as 
a labor market tool; * support for 
single parents; * and pensions vs. 
superannuation.
In a period of austerity, the 
notion that welfare payments should 
be confined to the 'genuinely needy' 
has won supporters across the political 
s p e c t r u m .  W i th in  th e  la b o r  
movement, the idea is associated with . 
a traditional commitment to equality. 
On the right, ‘middle class welfare' 
is a favorite target for the purists who 
put economic ‘rationality' above 
electoral considerations.
There has been widespread 
support for government efforts to raise 
benefits for the very poor: single 
unemployed people and supporting 
parents. This has been achieved by 
increasing ‘supplementary’ payments
Women are still treated as a 
special case.
to these groups by extending the 
pensioner rent allowance (at a lower 
rate of $10 a week) to the unemployed, 
an d  by in c r e a s in g  c h i l d r e n 's  
allowances for supporting parents
The government's major attempt 
to target payments to the most 'needy'
— the pensions assets test has been 
greeted with much less enthusiasm. 
When Labor came to power there was 
only an income test for the pension, it 
didn't matter how much wealth people 
had tied up in assets Some wealthy 
people managed to rcducc artificially 
their income by converting it inio 
assets, and claimed the full pension. 
Despite this, the assets tesi hasn’t 
saved considerable sums ol money: the 
income test which a fleeted the rate of 
pension for every dollar earned over 
$20 (now $30) was severe enough to 
deny the pension to most wealthy 
people. But the ideological point was 
made — welfare is only lor those who 
need it.
This principle came under fire 
from the majority of pensioner 
organisations, including the most 
progressive for example, the
Australian Pensioners l eague. Wh\
was this? The pensioner movement 
had long experience of means testing 
from the days when people had to 
demonstrate that their relatives 
couldn't support them before they 
could be paid. There is a progressive 
argument fora universal pension: that 
it is a right for all Australians and if all 
are entitled to it. there will be more 
people committed to fighting to 
improve it. The biggest drawback of 
the ‘welfare for the needy’approach is 
that it relies on the state to impose a 
rational redistribution of welfare 
benefits. Of course, there is no 
guarantee that the money saved on 
‘middle class welfare’ wi*l go to the 
poor, especially if they are politically 
marginalised in the process.
It also ignores the other side of the 
w e lfa re  e q u a t io n :  t a x a t io n .  A 
standard argument in favour of 
targetting the ‘most needy’ is that the 
welfare cake is getting smaller; but this 
is taken for granted instead of leading 
to investigation of the prospects of a 
redistribution of wealth from the rich 
(via taxation) to all of us (via universal 
welfare provision). An alternative to 
the assets lest would have been 
a wealth tax applying not only to 
pensioners, but all wealthy people. 
This would have attracted far more 
revenue than the savings from means 
testing social security benefits. By 
taxing the rich (including their social 
security benefits) those with the 
greatest need will benefit most.
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The notion of targeting welfare 
services was popular in the welfare 
field well before the present economic 
malaise. The welfare sector has long 
campaigned against poverty and 
focussed its attentions on the needy. 
Poverty was placed on the national 
agenda by its efforts in the 'f>Os and 
'70s. However, there are limits to the 
gains which can be achieved b\ 
campaigning in this way. The very 
notion  of poverty  ideologically 
isolates its ‘victims' from the 
mainstream of the workingclass. They 
are already isolated in fact by mass 
unemployment and the child-rearing 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t h r u s t  u p o n  
supporting parents.
Having revealed the fact of mass 
poverty , the next step is to 
demonstrate that it is happening to 
ordinary working people and not some 
race of alien beings deserving of 
sympathy. There is a material basis for 
this: already 20 percent of Australians 
are dependent on social security. 
Nearly everyone will be dependent on 
the system at some stage in their lives. 
A good starling point is to force the 
government to meet its commitment to 
raise pensions to 25 percent of average 
earnings and to increase unemploy­
ment benefits to the same level. This 
has the potential to unite a very broad 
cross-section of people ana to reduce 
the political isolation of the welfare 
state's second-class citizens the 
unemployed and supporting parents. 
The funds needed (around SI .5 billion) 
should be obtained by taxing the 
wealthy for a start, by withholding 
next year's tax cuts lor the rich.
The alternative is lor social 
security dependents to become part ol 
a welfare ghetto. This is no doubt whai 
Howard has in mind when he promises 
not to increase government spending 
in real terms lor three years. With 
social security comprising over a 
quarter of the budget, it would have to 
be slashed dramatically to keep this 
promise al a time ol growing 
unemployment: this would be 
achieved by breaking up the universal 
welfare system and ottering tax cuts 
for middle income earners in return.
A national cash benefit for the 
unemployed was finally introduced in 
1944 after about 15 years of bitter 
struggle by organisation* of the 
unemployed, and unions. The catch-
cry both durini: and alter the war 
was that 'never again* would the 
suffering and social dislocation of 
mass unemployment be imposed on 
the Australian working class. For the 
sm all n u m b e r  of p eop le  left 
unemployed after the war there would 
be a statutory right to benefits, 
provided they were ‘available for and 
a c t i v e l y  s e e k i n g ’ f u l l - t i m e  
employment.
The recessions of 1964 and 1982 
changed government attitudes to the 
unemployed. Unemployment has 
increased tenfold in this period, to 
around 600,000 today (according to 
official figures); while about a quarter 
of this number have been out of work 
for over a year. Government responses 
have come in cycles, almost regard 
of the party in government. Ihe 
universal right to an adequate benefit 
has been threatened at each turn.
T h e  F r a s e r  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  
response was, at first, mainly
The very notion of poverty 
ideo log ically  iso la tes its 
‘victims* from the mainstream 
of the working class
ideological. The community wasn't 
used to mass unemployment and 
Fraser knew the issue had u. he 
defused bccause he wasn't a bo Lit to do 
anything about it. In the first lew 
months of government he engaged in 
dole bludger bashing. The government 
adopted a ‘hard cop soft cop' 
approach. It tightened the work test 
for unemployment benefits so that 
people could have their payments 
postponed for up to si\ (later 12) 
weeks for failing to dress properly tor 
job interviews, or for moving to an 
area o f ‘lowemplo\ment opportunity’. 
The interpretation of policy was left to 
individual DSS or CES offices, and 
varied across the countrv. Also in 
1976, it introduced the Community 
Youth Support Scheme to provide 
c o m m u n i ty -b a s e d  t ra in in g  and  
motivation for y«'ung unemployed 
people to help them find work. This 
was to soothe the welfare sector and 
Ihe churches wlm hn back with 
a vengeance when it was facing 
abolition in 1982.
Gradually, people got used to 
mass unem ploym ent mainly 
bccause its impact was largely 
confincd (until 1982) to unskilled 
workers and their children. The 
unemployed were left to exist on 
benefits which the government failed 
to index and which consequently fell 
behind the pension, (The single umlet 
18 dole was only 536 per week, aboiti 
hall the pension, when Hawke wax : 
elected.)
I abor at first sought to redress 
Fraser's neglect but it didn't get verj 
far. Benefits arc still around S7 per 
week less than pensions for adults and 
half the pension for those under IX. | 
Then a new preoccupation emerged, 
income support for unemployed youth 
should be used as a tool of laboui 
market policy. An expansionary 
economic program created over half a i 
million jobs in the first three years ol i  
government. Many were government! 
created  under the Community 
Employment Program (CEPI which 
subsidised local government anti 
community bodies to employ and train 
people for up toayeai at award wages. 
The new thinking was to remove as | 
many as possible from the dok queue 
and place them in training.
In 1985 the Kirby Report on laboui 
market programs was completed, and II 
it recommended a different approach 
to youth unemployment: traineeships 
This involved part-time paid work and 
part-time study through TAFE 
colleges, for a period of about 12 
months, with the arrangements to b< 
negotiated separately ineach industry 
The scheme sounded like a positive 
in i t ia t iv e ,  bu t it had serious 
ramifications for income support 
arrangements. Trainees were to to 
paid a ‘Trainee Allowance' which 
could be less than the award rale for 
part-time work, and could be as low as 
S90 per week. The implications for the 
social security system were clear when 
adult unemployment benefits were 
then S9I per week, and those over IM 
years got the adult rate. A battle 
ensued between two minister!.: 
Dawkins (with special responsibility 
for you th )  and Howe (Social 
Security).
It was a classic conflict between 
the principle of universal payments as 
a right and the so-called economic 
’rationalism’ of many of the Hawke
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Ministry. In the abscnce of strong 
political pressure to the contrary, the 
social security system was called upon 
to take on directly one of its functions: 
that of labour market tool. Dawkins 
won, and a lower‘intermediate rate’of 
benefit was created for 18-20 year- 
olds, by failing to increase their dole in 
line with the CPI.
No one on the left wants to see 
mass unemployment continue, and 
t ra in in g  and  w ork  ex p e r ien ce  
programs play an important role in 
preparing unskilled and long-term 
unem ployed  people  fo r w ork .  
Otherwise they would have difficulty 
finding work, even in a tight labour 
market. The greatest flaw in these 
programs is that, for the most part, 
they lead nowhere in the long run 
because they are not linked in any
consistent way with an industry policy 
which generates employment in 
industries which are efficient by world 
standards. In other words, they remain 
hasicallv 'dead end’ programs, and 
unemployed people are aware of this 
and resent it.
The government's labour market 
programs have now been overtaken by 
an emerging economic crisis which has 
led the government to a retreat into 
austerity. Although economic growth 
of at least three percent per annum is 
needed to prevent rising unemploy­
ment, even this target is unlikely to be 
achieved in this financial year. The 
Department of Employment and 
Industrial Relations acknowledges 
that there is a strong prospect of 
increasing unemployment. Govern­
ment policy towards the unemployed
The Age Pension is the rock upon which the social security system is founded.
is about to turn lull circle, with the 
Prime Minister himself taking the 
lead.
It was Clyde Cameron. Industrial 
Relations Minister in the Whitlam 
government, who coined the term 
‘dole bludger’. The Hawke govern­
ment, led by the Prime Minister him­
self, is returning to the ideological 
position adopted by Fraser in 1976. *1 
accept the fact that there are obviously 
some who are getting the benefit who 
shouldn’t be’ said Hawke in May this 
year, as he proposed a tightening of the 
work test.
He has now joined the Liberal's 
'work for the dole’ bandwagon. 
Hawke announced, in his economic 
policy speech in July, that a program 
would be established to encouragc 
unem ployed people lo perform 
voluntary work for their benefits. He 
clearly wants the schcme to be 
compulsory, arguing, in the face of 
much opposition from within Cabinet, 
that ‘if there are more places available 
than unemployed people to fill them, 
then the government will have to look 
at the issue of compulsion again'.
The genera] idea is th a t  
community organisations receive a 
subsidy to take on unemployed 
‘volunteers' who receive no payment 
for their services. Thesc'jobs’would be 
advertised through the CES, and the 
Social Security Act could be amended 
to make it a condition of receiving 
benefit that a person be available lor 
and seek voluntary as well as paid 
work. This has horrific implications 
for social sccuritv in Australia, and il 
would steer us in the direction of 
schemes in the US which require both 
unemployed people and supporting 
parents lo work part-time for their 
benefits. The Liberals are on record as 
supporting a compulsory scheme.
The work for the dole proposal 
has been attacked by all major welfare 
bodies which would have any role in 
setting it up, including the Australian 
Council of Social Service and the 
Y o u th  A ffa i r s  C o u n c i l .  T h e  
Australian Social Welfare Union, 
representing non-government welfare 
workers, also opposes it. They point 
out that the present lack of adequate 
s k i l l e d  w o r k e r s  in w e l f a r e  
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  w o u ld  c o n s ig n  
volunteers to performing largely 
menial tasks, and that there is already
*
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lo o  m u c h  rc lian ce  on  v o lu n te e rs  by 
g o v e rn m e n ts  w ish in g  10 fu n d  w elfare  
on  th e  ch eap .
E ven  if  th e  sch em e  fa ils  fo r  lack  o f  
o rg a n is a tio n a l a n d  C a b in e t s u p p o r t ,  ii 
h as  a lr e a d y  sh ifted  th e  w h o le  d e b a te  
o v e r  u n e m p lo y m e n t fro m  o n e  o f  
g o v e rn m e n t re sp o n s ib ili ty  to  p ro v id e  
jo b s . in co m es a n d  tra in in g , to  th e  
re sp o n s ib ilitie s  (o r  d eb t to  so c ie ty ) o f  
th e  u n e m p lo y e d  th em se lv es . A t th e  
sam e  tim e , th e  C E P , w h ich  p ro \id e <  
a n  a w a rd  w age  a n d  so m e  p ro p e r  
tra in in g , has ju s t  been  c u t d ra s tic a lly . 
T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  is o b v i o u s n  
c o n c e rn e d  a b o u t th e  p o litic a l re a c tio n  
to  g ro w in g  u n e m p lo y m e n t a n d  so m e  
sec tio n s  o f  it a re  keen  to  d ire c t th is  
re sp o n se  a g a in s t th e  u n e m p lo y e d
th em se lv es , in  a s im ila r  m a n n e r  to  
F ra se r. 1 h e re  is s u p p o r t  fo r  th is  
a p p ro a c h  in p u b lic  o p in io n  po lls  
w h ich  in d ic a te  th a t a p p ro x im a te ly  80 
pe rcen t o f  peo p le  s u p p o r t so m e  fo rm  
o f  w o rk  fo r  th e  d o le , w hile  a ro u n d  40 
p e rc e n t su p p o r t  a c o m p u lso ry  schem e. 
P re ju d ic e  a g a in s t th e  u n e m p lo y e d  is 
d e e p -se a te d .
T h e  d e b a te  n eed s to  he sh ifted  
h ack  to  a n  e m p h a s is  on  e m p lo y m e n t 
c r e a t i o n  t h r o u g h  g o v e r n m e n t  
in te rv e n tio n  in th e  e c o n o m y  a n d  
in d u s try  d e v e lo p m e n t p la n n in g . T h en  
th e  tra in in g  sch em es c u r re n tly  in p lace  
will m a k e  m o re  sense . In  th e  
m e a n tim e , th e  r igh t to  a d e c e n t in co m e  
w ith o u t a ll m a n n e r  o f  s tr in g s  a t ta c h e d , 
m u s t be  fo u g h t fo r .
Supporting parents (the vast 
majority of whom are women) are the 
most threatened of social security 
dependents in the new environment. A 
Sydney Morning Herald poll in April 
this year found, in answer to the 
question: ‘Who is in the most need of 
government support?', only four 
percent said supporting mothers. Five 
times as many supported the young 
unemployed or age pensioners. Yet 
supporting parents rate alongside the 
single unemployed as the most 
impoverished beneficiaries. The face 
of poverty today is female.
The Supporting Parents Benefit is 
paid to single parents, of whom the 
vast majority are separated or 
divorced women. The benefit has been 
surrounded by controversy since 
Labor introduced it in 1974. It was 
staunchly resisted in the bureaucracy. 
The popular mythology in social 
security offices through the '70s was 
that most claims were fraudulent — 
that the claimants were actually living 
with men. At first, benefits were 
cancelled on the mere suspicion that 
this was the case, with no reason given 
until the cheque failed to arrive. There 
was enormous stigma attached to the 
benefit, and it is not surprising that 
most beneficiaries only continue to 
receive it for around two years, 
according to the Social Welfare 
Research Centre at the University of 
New South Wales.
According to the SWRC, there are 
three reasons fo r the poverty 
experienced by most supporting
The alternative is for social 
security dependents to become 
part of a welfare ghetto
parents. Firstly, the lack of child care
— only about a quarter of single 
parents with pre-school age children 
are employed, and only a similar 
proportion use formal child care 
serv ices .  S eco n d ,  em ploym ent 
opportunities arc diminishing. Third, 
benefits are very low, and over three- 
quarters of the people on supporting 
parents benefit (SPB) earn no extra 
income. Benefits are so low, primarily 
because of the government's failure to 
index ad d i t io n a l  paym ents  for
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children or to set them at a realistic 
level (presently $16 per week). One- 
fifth of Australian children live in 
poverty, and a large proportion are 
dependent on supporting parents 
benefit.
The benefit has always been 
precarious because it confronts the 
ideal model of a family with two 
parents with the reality of separation 
and divorce, and the need for state 
support.  It offers a long-term 
alternative to dependence on men. At
The debate needs to be shifted 
back to an emphasis on 
employmeni creation
the same time, the numbers of 
supporting mothers on SPB has 
doubled from around 100.000 m 1974, 
to approximately 200.000 today. The 
reasons are mainly social, although a 
higher proportion of single mothers is 
dependent on SPB today for economic 
as well as social reasons. Separation 
and divorce increased in the 'seventies, 
partly reflecting the fact that people 
married earlier in the early 'seventies. 
The divorce rate is now. in fact, 
reducing, but it is still high enough to 
excite the paranoia of the ‘moralists’ 
who call for the tightening up of both 
family law and SPB eligibility. There is 
now a burgeoning  alliance of 
convenience between bodies like the 
Catholic Social Welfare Commission 
(who preach the virtues of the ‘family’) 
and economists who preach the 
virtues of small aovernment.
Into the fray steps the Social 
Security Review with its proposals to 
im p ro v e  the  e n f o r c e m e n t  of  
maintenance payments by non­
custodial parents (usually the father). 
A number of options have been 
floated, from direct deduction from 
the wage packets of maintenance 
payments ordered by the Family 
Court, to the automatic deduction ol 
maintenance according to a fixed rate 
per child and payment into a general 
fund for supporting parents. Most 
maintenance orders are not properly 
enforced, and reform in this area is 
long overdue. These ideas have been 
picked up by the Finance Department 
as a money-saving measure; and the 
department would like to see the
proceeds absorbed into consolidated 
revenue (in other words, no increases 
for SPB), This highlights the dangers 
in moves to deduct maintenance 
according to a fixed formula. It may 
simply be used as a device to shift 
responsibility from the state to non­
custodial parents which would be 
quite consistent with the ‘moralist’ 
approach. The removal of the 
discretion of the Family Court to take 
into account the nature of 'he prior 
relationship is another issue that 
warrants careful consideration.
The most effective solution in the 
long run is improvod child care and 
employment prospects for single 
parents. The state must acknowledge 
its responsibility for the raising of
children through community ana 
work-based child care, rather than 
tossing it back to single mothers. Some 
form of government income support 
for parents of pre-school-age children 
will probably be needed for some time, 
and perhaps this should be universal 
rather than confined to single parents.
One proposal recently floated is a 
universal benefit for parents (whether 
w o r k in g  o r  on  S P B )  w hich  
incorporates the family allowance 
(now paid to all parents of dependent 
children) and the extra benefit 
payments for children of social 
security beneficiaries. Single parents 
would then get one payment for 
themselves (becausc they can't work) 
and a share in the universal payment
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fo r  c h ild re n . S u c h  a  p a y m e n t w o u ld  
p ro b a b ly  be m e a n s  te s te d . T h is  h a s  th e  
p o litic a l a d v a n ta g e  th a t  all p a re n ts  
w o u ld  h av e  a c o m m o n  in te re s t in 
ra is in g  th e  b en e fit.
S u p p o r t in g  p a re n ts  w o u ld  be fa r  
less iso la te d  if all p e o p le  (s in g le  o r  no t 
s in g le ) c a r in g  fo r  a p re -sc h o o l-a g e  
ch ild  a t  h o m e  a lso  received  a b en e fit to  
c o m p e n s a te  fo r  th e ir  u n a v a ila b il i ty  fo r 
w o rk . T h is  w o u ld  d o  a w a y  w ith  th e  
n eed  to  in v es tig a te  c o n s ta n t ly  w h e th e r  
s in g le  p a re n ts  a re  still s in g le , an d  
rem o v e  th e  s tig m a  fro m  su p p o r tin g  
p a re n ts  b en e fit.
T h e re  is a n o th e r  lo n g  o v e rd u e  bu t 
d if f icu lt re fo rm  w h ich  is re q u ire d  if  w e 
a re  to  im p ro v e  th e  so c ia l se c u r ity  
s ta tu s  o f  w o m en . T h e  sy s tem  still 
t r e a t s  w o m e n  b a s i c a l l y  a s  th e  
d e p e n d e n ts  o f  m e n . a n d  fam ilie s  a s  
sin g le  in co m e  u n its . T h e  s u p p o r t in g  
p a re n ts  b en e fit is n o t p a id  to  a  w o m a n  
in v o lv ed  in a r e la tio n s h ip  wi t h  a m a n . 
T h e re  is s till a  ‘m a r r ie d  r a t e 'o f  p en s io n  
o r  b e n e fit, f ixed  a t a b o u t  5 /6 th s  o f  
tw ice  th e  s in g le  ra te ; a n d  m a rr ie d  
w o m en  c a n 't  rece ive  th e  d o le  if th e ir  
h u s b a n d s  w o rk  fu ll- tim e .
In  E n g l a n d ,  t h e  w o m e n ' s  
m o v e m e n t h a s  b een  c a m p a ig n in g  fo r 
so m e  tim e  fo r  ‘d isa g g re g a tio n *  
m e a n in g  th a t th e  in co m e  o f  o n e ’s 
p a r tn e r  be ig n o re d  fo r  so c ia l secu rity  
p u rp o s e s , a s  it is fo r  ta x a t io n  p u rp o s e s  
in A u s tra lia . C u r re n t  t r a d e  u n io n  
t h i n k i n g  in A u s tra lia  is a g a in s t thi s  o n  
th e  g ro u n d s  th a t  th e  w ives o | w e a lth y  
m en  s h o u ld n 't  rece iv e  u n e m p lo y m e n t 
b en e fit. H o w e v e r, fro m  a  b ro a d e r  
so c ia l v ie w p o in t, th is  re fo rm  is long  
o v e rd u e , a n d  th e re  a re  a lw ay s  
o th e r  w ay s  a n d  m e a n s  o f ‘s o a k in g ’ th e  
rich .
W h en  th e  t r a d e  u n io n  m o v e m e n t  
n eg lec ts  so c ia l s e c u r ity , its m em b ers  
o f te n  lo se  o n  th e  sw in g s w h a t th ey  ga i n  
o n  th e  ( in d u s tr ia l)  r o u n d a b o u t .  L iving 
s ta n d a r d s  can  be im p ro v e d  by  d ire c t 
tr a d e  u n io n  a c tio n  a g a in s t  e m p lo y e rs  
o r  by c a m p a ig n in g  a ro u n d  th e  so c ia l 
w age. U n io n s  a re  n o w  w a g in g  a 
m a s s i v e  s t r u g g l e  t o  e x t r a c t  
s u p e r a n n u a tio n  c o n tr ib u t io n s  fro m  
th e  bosses. It is a  p ro g re ss iv e  s tru g g le  
in a sm u c h  as . a t  p re s e n t, o n ly  hal l  t he  
w o rk e rs  (a n d  la rg e ly  th e  b e tte r -o f f  
h a lf )  rece ive  s u p e ra n n u a tio n .
H o w e v e r, th e  so c ia l w age  side  o f  
th e  e q u a t io n  h a s  b een  n eg lec ted . W h en  
th e  new  s u p e r a n n u a tio n  sch em es s ta r t
to pay henelits to retired workers, 
social security entitlements of these 
workers will beaffected. Superannuat­
ion is not exempt from the Age 
Pension income test, and for every 
dollar received over S30 per week, a 
single pensioner loses 50c of his/ her 
pension. The government is delighted 
(all except the Social Security Minister 
Mr Howe) at the future savings 011 Age 
Pensions which are in store.
S u p e r a n n u a t i o n  will a l s o  
increasingly affect the age pension in 
another way. There are generous tax 
concessions for employer contribut­
ions to superannuation schemes and 
for superannuation payments in the 
form of regular 'annuities’ to retired 
workers. So generous are these 
concessions that the government 
estimates that it will forgo a total of S4 
billion in tax in the new financial year 
as the superannuation push gathers 
steam. This is more than two-thirds of 
the annual age pension bill. Clearly, 
future governments won't be able to
ll nance both these tax concessions and  
the pension. The pressure for worker 
co n tr ib u t io n s  to su p e ran n u a t io n  
schemes would be inexorable.
Superannuation contributions 
... in the final analysis, are 
simply another form of fringe 
benefit
This. then, is the choice: either 
sponsor a greater expansion of 
s u p e r a n n u a t i o n  t h r o u g h  t a x  
concessions, or preserve the age 
pension as it stands. Which is the more 
progressive approach? The question 
was answered clearly by the labour 
movement in the 1930s when the 
conservative government sought to 
introduce its national superannuation 
scheme in place of the pension. A 
universal age pension funded by a 
progressive tax system benefits low 
ami middle income earners, especially 
women and others who have a 
‘broken' employment history.
I Here is no reason tor thinking 
that this has to he the outcome of the 
ACTU campaign, and the key to 
solving the problem is twofold: the 
pen s io n  incom e test and  tax  
concessions for superannuation. In 
1974. a government inquiry into
national superannuation recomm­
ended a two-tier system of retirement 
income: the age pension and a 
universal superannuation payment 
equivalent to five percent of average 
earnings. The latter payment would go 
to all and would not be means tested. 
The gov ernment w ould pick up the tab 
for those who lacked the employment 
history to generate the money needed 
for the live percent payment from 
superannuation contributions, fhe 
government now proposes to set up a 
'safety net' scheme lor workers' not 
picked up by the industry schemes, hui 
if this is established it will probably 
only apply to people in the workforce.
The live percent payment on lop 
of a pension of 25 percent of average 
earnings would meet the pensioners' 
demand for a retirement income of at 
least 30 percent of a.w.c.
On the taxation side, there is little 
justification for tax concessions for 
e m p lo y e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  Tax 
concessions for superannuation fund 
investments -  involving huge sums of 
money should be used as a lever to 
influence investment policy. The rate 
of  tax a t io n  of superannuation  
payments for the wealthy should be 
reviewed. In 1983. the government 
increased the tax on superannuation 
payments to a ceiling of 30 percent, a 
figure still well below the highest I 
marginal tax rate. There was an outcry 
at this which was totally unjustified 
One of the major campaigns against 
the changes was run by the airline 
pilots. They have recently completed a 
similar campaign to transfer their 
c u r r e n t  f r in g e  b e n e f i t s  into 
superannuation contributions in I  
effect to avoid the fringe benefits tax 
on their employers. This demonstrates 
clearly the potential for evasion of a I  
progressive tax through the tax 
concessions for superannuation  
contributions (which, in the final 
analysis, are simply another form of 
fringe benefit).
The age pension is the rock on I  
which the universal social security 
system is founded. If it is eroded, the 
more vulnerable benefits will follow
PETER D A V ID SO N  is federal secretary 
o f the Australian Social Welfare Union.
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NOEL COUNIHAN
Robert Smith
Noel Counihan was born on the eve of the Great War; he died recently, some seventy-two years 
later. Throughout his career as an 
artist, extending over more than half a 
c e n t u r y ,  he p r o d u c e d  w ork  
consistently dedicated to a humane, 
committed attitude to the world. Yet 
his view of the world was not static. 
Just as life underwent numerous 
i changess, from Depression to war to 
Cold War and McCarthyism, to new 
interventionist wars, to a great wave of 
liberation movements, so Counihan's 
art developed and changed with the 
times.
It is important to realise that his 
work has this internal consistency and 
continuity as well as development and 
change, for they are joint indicators of 
Counihan's artistic and political 
integrity. In that same period. Western 
art also went through numerous 
changes, but they werechanges usually 
defined in purely stylistic terms. One 
style was succeeded by another in an 
increasingly formalist cycle which 
came to be known as “the mainstream" 
of modern art. Although it is now 
becoming recognised that European 
modernism had powerful political
origins, from World War II onwards 
formalist critics inceasingly argued 
that politics and art do not mix, and 
that art is only “pure” when it is free 
from politics. Today, we can see that 
such theories and the art they 
supported were integral aspects of the 
C o ld  W a r  a n d  o f  r a m p a n t  
consumerism. It hardly seems m;re 
coincidence that art, like other 
commodities became more and more 
subject to the rule of the marketplace, 
with art objects treated as investments, 
and styles rapidly superseded to 
prevent over-supply of any one 
particular kind of product.
These conditions exerted an 
enormous pressure on artists, no 
matter how genuine, to conform to the 
latest supra-national artistic fashions. 
Part of the attraction of modernism 
was that artists were able to convince 
themselves thai its emphasis on 
“formal values" offered them artistic 
independence, free from the debased 
m o r a l  v a l u e s  o f  b o u r g e o i s  
utilitarianism. In the name of rejecting 
false social values, subject matter was 
devalued, becoming a mere pretext for 
form al “e x p e r im en ts”, o r  was 
renounced altogether. The fact that 
Noel Counihan was responding to 
events in the wider social context
rather than to the isolationist and 
elitist attitudes of this self-defining 
“mainstream” of “contemporary ar t” 
gave his work a genuine sense of 
p u rp o s e  which  s t im u la te d  its 
autonomous internal development. 
This has been the case with all 
committed artists: Goya in a Spain 
s u b j e c t  t o  o p p r e s s i o n  a n d  
obscurantism; Daumier involved in 
the struggle of the French for 
republican democracy; Kollwitz in a 
militarist Germany moving towards 
successive wars and Nazi domination. 
It is no accident that Counihan saw 
himself as working in the same 
humane and realist tradition of which 
they are part.
The realism practised by such 
artists is not just a matter of technical 
skill giving the pictorial illusion of 
actuality. That rather naive approach 
can be equated with the art of the 
chocolate box, and might aptly be 
called descriptive naturalism to 
differentiate it from the more incisive 
and critical type of realism. Realism is 
not just a question of style either, any 
more than contemporary art is for that 
matter. To identify contemporary art 
or modernism with a particular style 
or sequence of styles is to trivialise the 
whole idea of modernity, or of 
contemporary relevance. As long ago 
as 1945, Bernard Smith perceptively 
referred to Noel Counihan as a
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“contemporary realist", making the 
very valid point that there is no basic 
conflict between modernity and 
realism.
‘’M o d e r n i s m ”  is q u i t e  a 
contentious term. If it means anything 
worthy of note it must refer to 
meaningful awareness of significant 
events, conditions and attitudes in the 
world about us. Counihan was a 
choirboy in St. Paul’s Anglican 
Cathedral in Melbourne in the 1920s, 
and suffered retribution when he had 
the temerity to protest at the unfair 
treatment of another member of the 
choir, whom he considered “a victim 
of oppression". So, even before 
■ Counihan was influenced by the events 
and atmosphere of the Depression and 
the impending war and fascism, he had 
this propensity for human compassion 
and social indignation. That, above 
all, is what is continuous in Noel's 
work. It inspired him to help found the 
Workers Art Club in 1931, to 
participate in the campaigns of the 
unemployed against evictions and for 
freedom of speech and assembly, and 
it led him to take a leading part in the 
movement against war and fascism. 
He was involved in one famous 
episode which led to legislative moves 
to curb the excessive power and 
a m b i t io n  o f  V i c t o r i a ’s C h ie f  
Commissioner of Police, Brigadier- 
G eneral T hom as Blarney ( la te r  
Australian Commandei-m-Chief in 
World War II). Police had been 
preventing unemployed protesters in 
Brunswick from making public 
speeches by arresting them for 
allegedly obstructing the traffic. Noel 
thw arted  this police tactic  by 
addressing the public from inside an 
old lift-cage bolted to the top of a 
wagon which was padlocked to a shop 
verandah. The resulting publicity gave 
rise to the 1933 Street Meetings Act 
requiring the courts to be satisfied in 
such cases that there really had been 
undue obstruction of actual traffic. 
Robert Gordon Menzies was state 
Attorney-General at the time, but took 
no part in debate on the bill, which 
tends to suggest that he did not share 
the a la rm  of his conservative  
colleagues at Blamev's apparent 
attempts to act as a power above the 
law.
In  t h e  l i g h t  o f  N o e l ' s  
wholehearted involvement in political
Noel Counitum, Namatjira
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activity, it would almost seem 
unnecessary to discuss the relationship 
between art and politics in his life, 
except that the process of artistic 
creation is widely misunderstood, and 
e s p e c ia l ly  the  p r o d u c t i o n  of 
po litica lly-com m itted  art.  Many 
people of the left (and of the right!) see 
such art as nothing more than literal 
illustrations — the kind of treatment 
which, as in bourgeois naturalist art, 
p r o d u c e s  n o th in g  m o re  th a n  
descriptive naturalism, leaving viewers 
to draw the appropriate conclusions, 
according to their point of view. Not 
even in his illustrations to literary 
works did Counihan lapse into this 
literal kind of approach. His art is the 
natural outcome of his profound 
convictions about life, and not just a 
translation of his political beliefs into 
pictorial forms. Rather, his politics 
and his art both arose from the same 
source in his compassionate and 
socially aware nature. The same 
impulse which motivated him to 
become an artist led him to join the 
Communist Party, and he never lost 
sight of that basic impulse common to 
both - - the impulse towards a better 
and more equitable world.
In art, Coumhan's themes are 
always related to social equity, 
liberation from oppression, and 
opposition to war. There is constant 
awareness that these are not just 
political abstractions, but real issues 
involving real people, and requiring 
social action. With specific oppression 
and specific wars the subject matter 
varies, and the character of his art 
changes accordingly. The human 
figure is usually central because he is 
concerned about human interests and 
the hum an cond ition .  One of 
Counihan’s great strengths is the 
superb drawing ability which he 
nurtured by continually drawing from 
the model at a time when, under the 
spelt of modernism, drawing, and 
especially hgure  draw ing, was 
generally out of artistic fashion. On 
the basis of such rigorous methods of 
working, Counihan’s style is derived in 
a completely organic way from his 
thematic concerns, and has deveiooed 
in all sorts of ways to create artistic 
metaphors for those concerns. Many 
o f the images which welled u d  in him 
out of his concern with particular
historical situations are not realist in 
any technical sense. Often they are 
symbols, but they are symbols which 
em body p rofound  insights into 
underlying social realities. At the same 
tim e, they  usua lly  reveal his 
consciousness of the continuing causes 
of human suffering and degradation.
V a r io u s  m o t i f s  r e c u r  in 
C o u n ih a n 's  w o rk ,  m an ife s t in g  
themselves in difierent ways in 
accordance with specific topical 
subject matter. In 1951, when he was 
seventeen or eighteen, he produced his 
first prints — two linocuts: Tycoon 
and A Sexless Parson. There is no 
doubt that these represented, for him, 
two aspects of institu tionalised  
society, each of them indifferent to the 
fate of individual human beings. There 
are recurrent allusions to both 
throughout his work, often many 
decades later. When Albert Namatjira 
died on 8 August 1959, Counihan saw 
this as martyrdom by the callous 
institutions of commercial society, and 
set about creating an allegorical image 
of Namatjira, choosing the linocut 
medium with its starkly dramatic 
graphic potential. A first attempt was 
rejected, but the definitive version was 
ready in time for a hand-printed 
impression to be reproduced with 
C o u n ih a n 's  w r i t ten  t r ib u te  to  
Namatjira in the Melbourne Guardian 
on 27 August. With bitter irony, the 
m ission-reared  ar tis t  is shown 
crucified against an impersonal 
background of the city with its 
cathedral, symbolising the vested 
interests of church and corporate 
capital. Nearly twenty years later, in 
1978, similar imagery re-emerged with 
his awareness of “lots of young 
unemployed dossing out — a return to 
the ’thirties”. The resulting series of 
drawings and prints include some 
called City, others called Cathedral, 
clear references to tht continuance of 
the same indifference there had been to 
the plight of the unemployed during 
the Depression, and to the death of 
Namatjira in 1959.
Som e o f  C o u n ih a n ’s most 
powerful works arise from his 
response to the Viet Nam war, and 
especially the involvement of young 
Australian soldiers. J n  his own words, 
he was distressed by “the hypocrisy 
and cant of our position here, the 
despo lia tion  and co r ru p t .o n  of
masculine virility in the sense that we 
sent very young men who hardly knew 
where Viet Nam was. They went off 
with faces like babies' bums”. Noel 
d ep ic ted  these  y o u n g s te rs  as 
simultaneously unwitting aggressors, 
and victims, dehumanised by the 
experience. His drawings, paintings 
and prints carry symbolic undertones 
of crucifix ion , o f  quasi-phallic  
potency, and of potential fecundity as 
a positive co u n te rp a r t  to the 
defoliation of both the countryside 
and the young manhood of the 
intruders. As the other side of the 
e q u a t i o n  he saw  th e  g r o s s  
individualism and self-indulgence of 
the mercenary society which sent off 
its youth to die in unjust wars. This 
engendered a corresponding series of 
works on The Good Life, with symbols 
o f  m o r a l  b l in d n e s s ,  p h y s ic a l  
decadence and social decline. In a 
related series. The Laughing Christ, a 
sardonic Christ-figure mocks the 
depraved ethical values of a society 
which pays only lip-service to 
ostensibly Christian standards.
Counihan constantly worked 
from the particular to the general, so 
his works stand as great universal 
images of human suffering, human 
endurance and human aspiration. In 
the past five years he had repeated 
heart attacks and a stroke which made 
the doctors think he might never work 
again. Work was very important to 
him, for he looked on himself as a 
worker just as much as the workers 
whose lives and interests he was 
representing in h .san. During his last 
twelve months or so, sometimes 
working as little as an hour a day, he 
produced some really striking images. 
They reach out with a universal 
significance. Some of them are to do 
with what he saw, on the television, of 
what was happening in Lebanon. But 
they go beyono that: they work from 
the particular to a generalised 
statement about great human issues 
opposing oppression and opposing 
war and looking forward to a better 
kind of real world.
ROBERT SM ITH In ch es art history at 
Flinders University in South Australia, 
and is the author of the standard work on 
N oel Counihan's prints.
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New Horizons
Viewpoints on Moving Left, edited by David McKnight (Pluto 
Press, 19S6). Reviewed by FRANK STILWELL and BOB 
MAKINSON.
T he need for the left to reassess its position in Australian society and politics is all too obvious. 
The New Right is rampant (although 
the ideas are far from new, being 
largely a mixture of social Darwinism 
and pre-Keynesian economics).
The Hawke governm ent is 
pursuing policies of conservative 
economic management which make 
John Howard's policies as Treasurer 
in the previous Liberal government 
look positively anaemic. The buoyant 
economic conditions which prevailed 
in 1983-85 are now in tatters, with all 
the leading economic indicators 
pointing to a looming recession. 
Australian capitalism is not delivering 
the goods.
Yet the support for a left 
alternative has not been established. 
The membership of the existing left 
political parties is small and 
fragmented. The ALP left is not 
e v i d e n t l y  i n f l u e n t i a l  in t h e  
determination of policy (with the 
exception of the effective brake it 
placed in conjunction with the trade 
unionists and welfare groups on 
propposals to the 1985 Tax Summit). 
T he co n se rv a t iv e  m ed ia  bias 
perpetuates a bourgeois hegemony, 
most obviously in the realm of 
economic policy, where the manifest 
irrationality and blatant inegalitarian- 
ism of the “economic rationalists" 
currently holds sway.
In these circumstances, the issues 
raised in Moving Lefi are crucial and 
timely. I he project which the book 
represents - - one of stocktaking 
reappra isa l ,  sclf-criticism, ands 
redirection for the left is admirable. 
The nine contributors represent a 
spectrum of views, including "green” 
and feminist perspectives. ALP and 
CPA, for and against a new left party: 
but, more important, for the most part 
their contributions arc open, inquiring 
and non-dogmatic. This is a book to 
stimulate critical rethinking on the 
left, both individuallyand collectively.
The most obviously tantalising 
a r e a  o f  d e b a t e  i n v o l v e s  the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  s o c i a l  
movements and political parties. The 
movements formed around issues of 
environmentalism, peace (including 
the movement against uranium 
mining) and feminism have been 
more prominent and commanding of 
community support than the formal 
party organisations of the left. (One 
might also add to the trilogy a fourth 
leg. that of anti-racist movements, 
broadly encompassing the movements 
for multiculturalism. for Aboriginal 
land rights and against apartheid.) 
How. if at all. are these social 
movements, which are certainly not 
socialist in all respects, to be linked?
Attempts by existing political 
parties of the left to capture 
movements are obviously counter­
product ive.  as the N D P / S W P  
experience has shown, is some kind of 
“rainbow coalition” the answer? That 
seems too diffuse to be effective, let 
alone to serve as a means of 
accelerating the proccss of people's 
radicalisation through struggle and of 
harnessing that experience to a 
socialistanalysis. So what of the third 
alternative, of a new political party 
built on principles of environment­
alism. feminism, peace and anti- 
racism? Could this generate anything 
more than the superficially progressive 
policies of the Australian Democrats? 
What, if anything, would be its 
relationship to a marxist analysis of 
capitalism or to a vanguard role in the 
process of political change? My own 
conclusion, derived from pondering 
the contributions to this book (and 
other discussions and experiences) is 
that a new political grouping is 
needed. There must be an effective 
means of harnessing the progressive 
elements within the various social 
movements and of seeking to capture 
the energies of those on the ALP left 
who are disillusioned with the 
unprincipled politics and conservative
THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM IN AUSTRALIA
Edited by 
DAVID hFKNIGHT 
*
economics of the Hawke-Keating 
administration.
Still, the issue of an alternative 
strategy remains a problem. The 
introduction to the book notes that 
“the economy is the logical starting 
point since, if the left is known tor 
anything, it is that it places the control 
and operation of the economy at the 
centre of its theory and practice". A 
number of contributors subsequently 
refer to the issue; but it is clear that 
they are more comfortable discussing 
visions of socialist sucicty and/or 
problems o f  reconciling social 
objectives and political practices, than 
in setting out a transitional program 
for managing and transforming the 
capitalist economy. John Mathews' 
chapter in the book suggests that the 
Accord has — or could have — the 
role of a transitional program towards 
socialism: but with the benefit of a tew 
months more hindsight, it seems like 
so much wishful thinking. What would 
a more radical alternative economic 
strategy look like? Is it possible?These 
are questions which clearly underlie 
the discussion of the prospects for 
progressive social change: they arc noi 
adequately considered in this book 
but, by the same token, they arc not 
pre-judged either. The formulation ol 
an alternative economic strategy is 
clearly an important and urgeni
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analytical task for the left. What this 
book reminds us is that the process of 
such strategy formulation must be 
decentra lised , par t i c ipa tory and 
democratic.
It is not difficult for the left to be 
self-critical. The problems ofanalysis, 
i nc l udi ng the r e appr a i s a l  and 
modernisation of marxist analysis, are 
daunting. The imperfections of the 
institutions of the labour moement, 
such as trade unions and existing left 
political parties, are evident: everyone 
has their own illustrative anecdote. 
The task is to rebuild without 
unnecessary demol i t ion in the 
meanwhile. The foundations are there. 
The revolutionary slogan “liberty, 
fraternity, and equality” remains a 
s h o r t h a n d  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  the 
objectives: if nothing else, it reminds 
us that the New Right should not be 
unchallenged in their claim on the 
o b j e c t i v e  o f  l i b e r t y  — i ts 
preconditions, of course, include the 
elimination of economic exploitation. 
So. too, the goals of fraternity
oving Left is dense reading, 
but worth it. It is a useful step 
in analysing at least three of 
the key questions facing us:
* what are the ideas around which 
sections (not necessarily all) of the left 
could, or should, unite?
* what are the ideas on which a new or 
re-formed socialist formation could 
being to gain mass support?
* what sort of organisational forms 
will l end t h e ms e l v e s  to the  
c o m p l i c a t e d ,  and s o m e t i m e s  
contradictory, tasks of movement- 
building and party-building?
The concentration on ideas is not 
accidental — nearly all of the 
co n t r i b u t o r s  a c k n o w l e d g e  tha t  
counter-ideological struggle is the 
order of the day Some express this as 
popularising a “new socialist vision” 
for society. Others see it in more 
traditional (they would say “less 
nebulous”) terms of program and 
policies. The distinction is scarcely 
important — socialist renewal will 
require a thorough spring-cleaning 
from ethics to economics ana back 
again.
All the contributors demonstrate 
some commitment to an integration of
(sui tably modified to el iminate 
patriarchal connotations)and equality 
remain the moral high ground which 
the left should continue to take pride 
in occupying.
The various contributions to 
M oving Left arc a frank airing of 
different views about the most 
appropriate process of rebuilding and 
regrouping. It deserves to be widely 
read. A more sharply focussed 
introduction or conclusion even the 
reproduction of David McKnight's 
previous essay published in Socialism 
in Australia: Toward Renewal — 
would have helped bring out the key 
issues. It is hard to imagine the right 
coming out with such a public exercise 
in self-appraisal and criticism: but the 
left has nothing to lose for such 
candour. Pluto Press is to be 
congratulated for its good work in 
providing a vehicle for this ongoing 
debate.
FRANK  STILW ELL teaches economics 
at Sydney U niversity.
the socialist economic and class 
analysis  with “new mo v e me n t ” 
analyses. All are concerned with what 
sorts of visions and policies will strike 
a chord with a constituency in the 
working class and beyond, and with 
what sort of package of radical 
reforms could provide a platform 
ag a i n s t  t he c u r r e n t  r i gh t wi ng  
offens.ve. Not all see that offensive in 
the same light — Belinda Probert, in 
an otherwise incisive essay, denies 
“any generalised shift to the Right, nor 
have progressive forces generally been 
more on the defensive than usual”. 
This may be so for some of the social 
movements, but is certainly not true 
for the union, welfare and living 
standards areas.
Some of the old perennial debates 
are given an airing — what isclass?To 
what extent is work in the ALP 
desirable or possible? These get a 
reasoned and tolerant treatment that 
probably has more to do with the 
selection of contributors than with any 
real new-found consensus on the left. 
The problem of linking socialist and 
“new movement” goals into an 
integrated program is mainly dealt 
with at the level of practical politics, 
with an occasional encouraging foray
into the moral implications, which are. 
after all, essential if our ideas are to 
inspire millions. The only attempt at a 
philosophical approach is by Eric 
Aarons, whose “rainforest ecosystem" 
model of society is counterposcd to the 
mechanistic views which tend to 
dominate socialist theory.
One nevertheless gets the feeling 
that we are still dealing with variants 
of the shopping-list approach, with a 
main aim of negotiating a new 
working relationship between existing 
progressive forces. There is less 
attention to the tactical and strategic 
problems of appealing to entirely new 
sections of the population. The whole 
question of nationalism or national 
identity, which is certainly recognised 
as an area for activity by the right, is 
largely ignored. Nor is there more 
than a cursory reference to the 
m i g r a n t  c o m m u n i t i e s ,  t h e i r  
orientation towards the ALP, and 
whether that can be changed.
One key practical question in the 
debate on the limits of reform is 
touched upon by some contributors, 
a n d  c a n  be i l l u s t r a t e d  by 
environmental issues. While the 
Franklin Dam and NSW rainforest 
decisions have been pol i t ical ly 
significant and have secured those 
areas for the time being, it remains true 
that an ironclad social consensus on 
preservation of wilderness and genetic 
diversity is still a long way off. 
Incremental gains, based largely on 
piecemeal legislation, can still be 
rolled back by a mere change in 
government and, in any case, are not 
comprehensive. (Witness Aboriginal 
land rights, around which there were 
real but fragile advances in the 1970s.) 
Rainforests are. thanks to the work 
done by the environmental movement, 
a popular issue. Preservation of 
semi-arid environments has less public 
appeal, but no less scientific or social 
priority.
Environmental politics must sooner 
or later tackle the need for a national 
land use plan as a national priority, 
w h i c h  e n s h r i n e s  w i l d e r n e s s  
preservation as a national goal, but 
also sets management goals for 
exploited land (including freehold). 
The left and environmental movement 
could be seen in this way to be taking 
up major national issues that no one 
else is prepared to address. We could
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begin lo gel across the idea that 
three-year electoral schedules and 
political expediency provide no 
rational basis for dealing with many of 
the problems facing Australia and its 
working people. This is not to suggest 
that we should not pursue incremental 
legislative gains - - but we should also 
begin to muster support and expertise 
for cogent and popuiarly-arguable 
national goals. Socialism is, after all, 
supposed to promote rational and 
humani s t i c  pl anning for  social 
development.
The same sort of reasoning 
applies to any strategy for significant
I t might seem a trifle late for a review of a book which was, as its preface states, produced “as an attempt to capture the essence of the 
position of women" at the end of the 
UN Decade for Women. But then, it 
sometimes feels as though the women's 
movement has been placed in a time 
warp — with the End of the Decade 
providing a signal for conservatives to 
turn the clock well back. With this 
b o o k ,  d e s p i t e  s o m e  o f  i ts  
shortcomings, we can savour, to an 
extent, the gains made through hard 
slog, and an awareness of1 differences 
within the international women's 
movement.
The book looks at five aspects of 
women's life: family; work; education; 
politics; and sex. Two countries are 
examined under each of these a 
poor country and a wealthy country, 
with a woman from a poor country 
visiting the wealthy country and vice 
versa, each giving their personal 
impressions of the country visited. The 
purpose of this was xo give the book 
“true depth”. And the purpose of the 
reciprocal conjunction of wealthy and 
poor was to avoid “just another piece 
of international voyeurism” with *Lthe 
rich world ogling at the poor” Hence, 
under the heading of “Women and 
Sex”. Australia was visited by Elena 
Poniatowska (journalist: born in Paris
constitutional reform, or for revival of 
the recently-murdered Bill of Rights, 
and for industry/government research 
and development strategies. The 
general problem remains of how best 
to popularise the notion of goals and 
planning, and particular reforms. It 
can do us no harm to try out 
alternative approaches to coalition 
building on such questions, as long as 
we can (eventually) wrest from the 
right and big business control of 
Australia's political agenda.
BOB M AKINSON is ■ peace activist and a 
member o f the C.P.A .
of French-Polish lather and Mexican 
mother; now living in Mexico), while 
Angela Davis (Black American 
activist) visited Egypt. With all due 
respect, the fact that the writers spent 
only a matterof days(eleven in Elena’s 
case) in each country means that the 
pieces are indeed impressionistic. This, 
in itself, can be useful to locals to see 
jusi what it is thai impresses a visitor. 
But there is a very real danger of 
m i x i n g  p r e c o n c e p t i o n s  a n d  
f o r e k n o wl e d g e  wi th f i rs t ,  fast  
impressions. What can result are 
cliches. In the case of Australia. I fear 
this was the result.
The section on Australia begins 
with a full-page pic of a Surfers’ meter 
maid — replete in tinselly highcut 
onepiece bathers, sash and hideous 
tiara/ 1950s wailress-style headdress 
with the words "METER MAI D’ 
appliqued across it — and grasping a 
parking meter. Elena Poniatowska's 
observations ot Australia were that 
of a tourist-with-a-difference, in that 
she had a specific brief and contacts 
were provided. But these observations 
were not par t icular ly new or 
enlightening.
The comparisons between rich 
and poor communities are inevitable, 
and it is of value to see someone else’s 
astonishment at the community 
services women in Australia have
gained through the hard struggle of the 
w o m e n ’s m o v e m e n t ;  women ' s  
confidence in their own sexuality; and, 
inevitably, the continuing and high 
degree of exploitation of women and 
sex through commercialism. It is also 
useful to be reminded,  albeit 
secondhand in this instance, that 
Aboriginal women are well and truly 
fed up with the predominantly anglo- 
feminist movement's pontificating on 
and co-opting of their specific 
concerns. Nevertheless, the real issues 
for Australian feminism are far more 
complex than such an impression 
might give readers outside Australia 
(and even readers outside the women's 
movement in Australia).
It came across quite clearly that 
allotting each country a specific topic 
was perhaps not the best way to gain 
an informed opinion of the state of the 
women’s movement and women in 
general. And this was compounded by 
the shortness of the visits. A particular 
example is the assignment of sex as the 
specific topic for Egypt. Angela Davis 
was taken aback by the “palpable 
hostility” from a group of Egyptian 
women when she introduced her topic. 
However, she handled the situation 
with sensitivity, and her experience as 
an activist and theorist helped produce 
an interesting account of Egyptian 
women's concerns. It's worth noting 
that the editors apologised for a lack of 
adequate communication with Davis 
over the project's intention.
And that intention was to 
produce a substantial analysis of, and 
insight into, women’s lives around the 
world which, at the End of the Decade 
for Women, would set the future 
agenda. For the reasons I have 
mentioned, it has tallen snort of this, 
but it is still a worthwhile addition to 
literature on the development of the 
international women's movement.
There are other pieces by 
recognisable names, such as Nawal el 
Saadawi (on the UK), Germaine Greer 
(on Cuba) and Marilyn French {on 
India). The book also contains a useful 
statistical section. It was certainly a 
mammoth task — an appetiser, 
perhaps, for a deeper analysis.
JANE INGLIS is a feminist activist and i 
member o f the Sydney A LR  collective.
After the Decade
Women: A World Report (Pluto Press, 1985). Reviewed 
by JANE INGLIS.
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BROWSING
Ken Norting
THE LIFEBLOOD OF FOOTS— 
CRA Y: Working Lives at the A ngliss 
Meatworks, edited by Chris Healy. 
Living Museum o f the West,  
Melbourne, 198S. $8.00 paperback, 
164 pages.
Since its beginning in 1984, the Living 
Museum has tried lo record the lives of 
working people in M elbourne’s western 
suburbs. This volum e continues that 
project by presenting an  oral history of 
what was once F oo tscray ’s biggest 
em ployer, as told by th irteen  men and 
women who started  w orking there in the 
years before W orld W ar II. It is not ju s t an  
account o f what it was like to w ork at 
Angliss', though it does provide enough 
d e s c r ip tio n  o l th e  o f t en  a p p a l l i n g  
surroundings to  m ake vegetarianism  
sound a good idea. The con tribu to rs have 
much m ore to  say about life in an indust­
rial w orking class suburb , th rough  the 
Depression, the w ar, and the Yiflies and
’sixties. T heir accounts cover social life, 
union activity, and political organising, 
and are presented w ith a hum our and 
frankness that m akes them  an entertain ing 
as well as an inform ative read.
A vailable from  Living M useum  of the 
W est, 42-44 Ferguson St. W illiamstown 
3016.
BORN A HALF-CASTE, by Marnie 
Kennedy, Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal Studies. Canberra, 1985. 
$8.95 paperback, 68 pages.
Now and then  com m crciai publishers 
will produce a book by an A borigine, or 
ab o u t A boriginal life, but such occasions 
are rare. The A .I.A .S ., however, has been 
publishing such w orks fo r m any years 
now. This, like m any of its publications, is 
a  m em oir o f w hat it is like to live as an 
A borigine in white A ustralia. The aut hor  
was a K alkadoon , bom  in north-w est 
Q ueensland, bu t sent w ith her fam ily 
(except a  b ro th er w ho was old enough to 
w ork on the station) to  Palm  Island, where 
she spent her childhood. H er story is often 
a sad one, but it is also the story of a 
w om an of strength  and determ ination  
maki ng her way in a world where her 
abilities and her hum anity  were alm ost 
constantly  ignored or denied.
A vailable from  Book and Film Services, 
Box 226, A rtarm on  2064.
UNITY IN  ACTION: A H ISTORY  
OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL  
CONGRESS 1912-1982. A.N.C., 
London, 1984. $3.00 paperback, 72 
pages.
This is a short version of a yet-to-be- 
published history o f  the A .N .C . It is 
intended to  provide both  a history of the 
struggle for Black liberation in South  
A frica, and a statem ent o f the current goals 
and strategies o f the m ovem ent. The 
history of the A.N.C. is very much the 
history of m odern South  Africa. It begins 
with attem pts to petition the British 
governm ent for equal n g h tsfo rn o n -w h ite s  
in the new U nion of 1910, catalogues the 
continual frustra tion  of constitu tional and 
non-violent a ttem pts to  get reform s, and 
concludes with a descrip tion  of the politics 
o f arm ed struggle. It is a good short 
account o f why th a t struggle became 
necessary, and a clear statem ent o f the 
position o f  one o f the w orld ’s most 
p rom inent na tional liBeration m ovem ents.
A v a ila b le  f r o m A ..N .C ., B ox 683, 
Ringw ood 3134.
OUR BROKEN DREAM S, by 
Panagiota Halvatzis.  Richmond 
Workers Health Resource Centre, 
Melbourne, 1986. $2.00 paperback, 22 
pages.
Our Broken Dreams is an all-too-brief 
au tob iography  by a w om an who cam e to 
A ustralia in her youth with a dream  of a 
better I ife in a new country. In fact, she was 
to  spend 23 years w orking in textile 
factories, usually in  the m ost prim itive 
conditions on an tiquated  m achinery, and 
usually on piece w ork, until Repetitive 
S tra in  Injury m ade it impossible fo r her to 
continue working. In part, this is a  record 
of her com ing to  terms with that 
experience, including her struggles with 
the m cdical profession to  get proper 
diagnosis and treatm ent. It also provides 
an account o f her w ork with the W orkers 
H ealth  R esource C entre try ing to  change 
conditions in factories so tha t others do 
not suffer the sam e injuries. It is an  often 
grim  sto ry  and it is m ade grim m er by 
cu rren t th rea ts to  the funding of the centre 
by a  state governm ent departm ent w hich 
apparen tly  prefers to  pay its money to  
health professionals w h o are  never likely to  
see the w orking conditions which produce 
their steady flow of patients.
A vailable from  R ichm ond W orkers 
Health Resource C entre, 246 C hurch St, 
R ichm ond 3121.
T H I S  I S  A P A R T H E I D :  A 
PICTORIAL INTRODUCTION  and 
THIS IS  NAM IBIA: A PICTORIAL  
IN T R O D U C T IO N . International 
Defence and Aid Fund for Southern 
Africa, London, 1984. Each $1.50 
paperback, each 39 pages.
These pam phlets are aim ed prim arily a t 
secondary school students, but could be 
used fa r m ore widely, given how little 
knowledge there is o f the realities of 
Southern  Africa. They might be a little 
dated, particularly  in the light o f the 
grow th in strength  of the Black opposition  
over the last two years, but they still 
deserve wide circulation. They provide an  
invaluable sum m ary o f the ways in which 
apartheid  w orks, and of how South  Africa 
exploits N am ibia. All the facts are here, 
sharply and clearly, and are supported  by a 
pho tographic record which m akes it plain 
why people are willing to  face any suffering 
fo r an im m ediate end to  the system atic 
barbarism  of the white regime.
D istributed  by Pathfinder Press, Box 37, 
L eichhardt 2040.
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"TWO YOUTHS"
Silkscreened reproduction o l a 
1962 linocutby
^  y A c v w '
Ottered for sale by the Tribune Artwork Fund. 
Edition ol 350 signed bv the artist. Print 
size 34 n 57 cm., paper sue 57 x 78 cms. 
120.00 plus S3 postage and handling.
Cheque or money order 
Tribune. 1? Exploration Lane.
Melbourne 3000.
Name.... ,... ..................................
Address........... .................. .............................
.............................. ..............POslcode.,...........
A USTRALIANS IN SPAIN
Two historic pamphlets published originally in 1937, 
early in the Spanish Civil War by the Spanish Relief 
Committee, From the Battlefields o f Spain and 
Australians in Spain have been carefully reproduced 
and are now available with a foreword by 
International Brigades' veteran Lloyd Edmonds, and 
an introduction by Laurie Aarons.
The pamphlets are faithfully reproduced from the 
originals and arc* a stunning reminder of the passions 
and solidarity aroused in Australia for the Spanish 
people's struggle against fascism.
£8.00, plus S I.00 postage and handling.
Cheque or money order to:
Red Pen Publications, 12 Exploration Lane, 
Melbourne 3000.
HAVE YOUR SAY! 
ALR  READERSHIP 
SURVEY
As you m ay have noticed, the last issue o f A L R  was available ai 
newsagents in Sydney and o ther parts o f NSW . Soon, we hope to 
m ake it available a t M elbourne new sagents, too. We're also 
stepping up our advertising and prom otions. T o do all of this 
p roperly we need to  know m ore abou t o u r readers, and about the 
m agazine — and for th a t we need your help. Please fill in the 
follow ing survey and return  it to:
A L R  R eadership Survey,
P.O. Box A247. Sydney South . 
N .S.W . 2000.
Q l. How long have you been reading ALR?
Less than  one year □
2 - 3  years □
1 - 2 years □
4  y e a r s  o r  m o r e □
Q .2 How m uch o f  A L R  do  you read, on average?
Three quarters □
H alf to th ree-quarters D
Q uarter to  a half □
Less than  a q u arte r □
Q3 How many people, apart from  yourself, usually read or look ill 
a copy?
N one □  Three 0
One □  Four □
Two □  Five or more □
<J4. h o w  did y o u  urst come across A LR .'
H eard about it from  a friend □
Saw an ad □
Saw it in a shop or newsagent □
O ther □
If o ther, please specify ...............................................................
Q5. W hieh oi me Inllowing m agazines new spapers do you read? j
A ustralian Society □  Social A lternatives □
C hain  R eaction □  Greenpeace Exam iner □
Hecate □  Gay Inform ation Q
M ainstream  Unionist D  N ational Times Q
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Q.6 How old are y o “?
Q7. Are you:
Single
1 Living with a partner 
Married
□
□
□
Q8. What is your residential postcode? ...........................
Q9 What is your highest educational qualification?
School certificate □
HSC □
Trade certificate □
Diploma □
Tertiary degree □
010. Sex:
Female □  Male □
Qll .  What is your after-tax incom e per annum ?
0 - $5,000 □
$5 - 10.000 □
110- 15.000 □
SIS - 20.000 □
S20.000 - 25.000 □
S25.000+ □
QI2 Are you:
In paid full-time em ploym ent □
Sell-employed □
In paid part-tim e em ploym ent □
Unwaged □
(Jl? 11 in paid em ploym ent, arc you employed in the 
private sector?
puhne or
Public □  Private □
QI4. If public, which of the following:
Public service □  Health □
Education □  Local govt. □
Social services □  C om m unity work 
Other C]
□
II other, please specify ..........................................................
Q15. If private. which o f  the following:
A dvertising □ A ccountancy □
Media □ Law □
Retail □ Industry □
Services □ Building □
C om puting □ C atering □
O ther □
If o ther, please
Q !6. Which ol' the following are you:
H ouse/fla t ow ner □
H ousing C om m ission tenant □
Prisa te  tenant CD
C o-op tenani □
O ther □
QI7.  Arc you a m em ber of any or several ol the following?
A trade union □
A peace group  D
A com m unity group □
An environm ent group □
A w om en's group □
An Aboriginal group D
A gay group Cl
A solidarity organisation  d
A housing group □
A welfare group □
Q 18. In the last m onth, how m uch have you spent on:
O-SIO $10-25 $25-5(1 S50-75 $75 +
books □ □ □ □ □
records cassettes □ □ □ □ □
drink □ r , □ □ □
clothes □ □ □ □ □
eating out □ □ □ □ □
educational courses □ □ □ □ □
videos □ □ □ □ □
the movies □ □ □ □ □
Please return to:
A L R  Readership Survey,
P O Box A247. Svdnev South. 
N S W  2000.
Australian Society
“An outstanding magazine for 
Australians who really believe 
in the national ethos of 
everyone getting a 'fair go'
-  BOB BROWN
n i
I r i
“Wot just an alternative voice. 
In social policy, economics, 
employment policy, urban 
issues, the media and the law 
Australian Society is 
usually indispensable
-  KEITH WINDSCHUTTLE
"Thoughtful, informative. .  .a 
comprehensive view of virtually 
every important issue".
-  JUSTICE ELIZABETH 
EVATT
K BP 1 1 1 1  m a —SOCIETY
A M AGAZINE OP SO C IA L  15 3 I  E-S •  SI JrTI HBEV H
If you re looking for an independent 
viewpoint on the key social, 
economic and political issues, it's 
time you subscribed to AUSTRALIAN 
Society. Each month our 
contributors look in detail at the 
issues that really matter —the 
floating of the dollar, constitutional 
reform, the future of Australia’s 
cities, funding for the arts, 
government spending.. .Regular 
writers comment on the media, 
national politics, the law and health 
care.
“I read AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY 
because it deals with the 
important issues not just the 
'newsworthy ’ ones 
-P E T E R  SINGER
ves I'd like to subscribe to 
Australian Society at
□  $30/1 year, □  *55/2 years, □  {80/
3 years, □  $40/Institulional 1 year.
□  $70/2 years, P  £24/Concesston 1 «ea
□  Cheque enc'wed
Please deduct my □  Bankcard.
□  Mastercard, □  Diners Card, □  Visa
EXPIRY DATE SIGNATURE 
NUMBER
NAME______________________
ADDRESS
POSTCODE TELEPHONE
OCCUPATION
Send form with remittance to A u s t r a l i a n  
PO Box 274. Fitzroy 3065
AUSTRALIAN LEFT 
REVIEW •
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WHAT MAKES THE NEW RIGHT FUMFI? “ » u„?;
. t( inior,»i Cnf *n
/n  our /os/ issue A L R  carried a special 
feature on Affirmative Action which 
had the New Right's plaything The 
Bulletin fuming about 'crude feminist 
porkbarrelling’.
A nd months before Hawke and Young 
got on the bandwagon, we were 
running important articles on ‘John 
Howard and the Reborn R ight’ 
(Summer 1985) and why ‘The New 
Right is N ew’ (Autumn 1986).
So make sure of your quarterly dose of 
crude feminist porkbarrelling. And  
keep abreast of what the New Right
thinks.
* 'cr
* * * »  .  '*Us"a/ia.
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6 issues of Australian Left Review...........at $12 concession $10 libraries/institutions $20
Send to: ALR, P.O. Box A247, Sydney South, NSW2000.
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INFORMATION FOR ADVERTISERS
Rates fo r  space in A L R
Back cover Inserts
-  only available as a full page. $80 per 1,000
2 colours plus black: $220.00 (Some discounts are available for non-profit
Inside fron t cover organisations.)
full page 242mm x 180mm $120.00 A rtw ork
half page 242mm x 90mm S60.00 All prices above are on the basis o f  the advertiser
or 180mm x 180mm $60.00 providing camera ready artwork.
quarter 120mm x 85mm $30.00 Discounts
Inside back cover and all other pages A 10%  discount applies for repeat advertisements.
full page (dimensions as above) $90.00 Advertising policy
column 242mm x 55mm $30.00 ALR will not accept advertisements which are racist or
half column 120mm x 55mm $20.00 sexist.
half page 242mm x 90mm $45.00 Invoicing
or 120mm x 180mm $45.00 Advertisers will be sent an invoice on publication o f
the advertisement, together with a copy o f  the edition. 
Payment is required within 30 days.
MARXISM
ik
FEMINISM 
CMr UBERAHOIV 
PSYCHOLOGY 
P O U T K S
ECONOMICS
I
E W fF O K M E N T
1H1STOR) 
EDI rC. \J I(>\ 
MEDIA
NATIONAL
B  O O K S B H O  F»
2ND FLOOR 17 3000 TEL 03 61
THE INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHOP CARRIES AUSTRALIA’S LARGEST RANGE OF BOOKS
ON POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES.
‘BOOKNEWS’ -  QUARTERLY LIST OF NEW BOOKS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST
MAIL ORDER SERVICE PROVIDED 
ALSO SECOND HAND LEFT BOOKS, JOURNALS, PAPERS.
